EDITS | Wednesday, February 4, 2009 | Email | Print | 
Not optionless on Pakistan
Ashok K Mehta
More than two months after the Mumbai terror attack, a stalemate has been reached over Pakistan satisfying India on its demands. The new Obama Administration has shifted the spotlight to the central front, Afghanistan, with ground zero Pakistan, together the epicentre of terrorism. While Pakistan and Afghanistan blame each other for their jihadi woes, the US is making a renewed effort to fix the problem that resulted in Mumbai. As Pakistan and the US buy time on Mumbai and ensure there is no second terrorist attack on India, are we learning lessons from the incident?
Briefing the US Senate Committee on Homeland Security, Mr Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment and Mr Brian Jenkins of Rand have warned that India would continue to face jihadi attacks from terrorist groups based in Pakistan. Worse, they said India lacked effective military options to stop and deter these attacks without triggering dangerous escalation. India’s counter-terrorism responses were inadequate, lacking a clear strategy and suffering from imperfect techniques and resources. The Rand report noted “in several respects the NSG hostage rescue plan for the Taj and Trident Oberoi hotel suffered from serious defects like storm teams went in blind with no understanding of the basic layout of either of the two buildings”.
It is not unpatriotic to be critical of our operational performance. In the first public test of its mettle, the NSG did not come up to scratch. This is the view of many professional soldiers. Our commandos are guided by outdated ideas on use of force and equipment that led the Rand study to confirm that India is a terribly soft state.
What is more regrettable is the camouflage of lapses through generous distribution of gallantry awards. These are meant for conspicuous bravery and valour in the face of the enemy not for getting killed for any adventurous or foolish professional omission or commission. This devalues the highest peacetime gallantry award. The politicisation of valour was highlighted earlier by the Batla House encounter —— recognised by the Government even as a senior Minister demanded an inquiry.
The phenomenon of fake encounters among security forces in Siachen or Silchar has been encouraged by improper scrutiny of fire fights and the lure of cash and gallantry awards. Mass awards will make genuine acts of bravery inflationary. All the policemen killed during the terrorist attack on Parliament House in 2001 being decorated and glorified was also uncalled for. By this yardstick all the 512 soldiers killed in Kargil should have got a chakra for bravery.
Government has to institutionalise preventive and punitive measures for internal security. Some steps have been taken but these will not do till there is a separate Ministry of Internal Security just as the Ministry of Defence is for external security. Equally important, the ministry has to be manned by an effective individual, not some shilly-shallying unprofessional politician.
A big lacuna in national security is the preference for IAS, IPS and intelligence officers over military officers. Assertion of civilian control over military is expressed in bizarre ways to the detriment of national interest. Why is India denied a specialised national security cadre?
Excluding the military from decision-making undermines the application of power. Nearly 80 per cent of intelligence and national security posts, including internal security, in the US are held by service officers with military background. Despite the so-called integration of services with Government just two officers are posted in the Ministry of External Affairs and a handful in the Ministry of Defence. One hopes that the quick-fix on internal security will be replaced by a comprehensive and overarching system once a new Government takes office.
Meanwhile, Pakistan will take minimum steps to bring to book the culprits and organisations responsible for the Mumbai attack and it is certain that jihadi camps and bases targeting Jammu & Kashmir and India will remain in business. The unspoken deal between the US and India is that the former will do its best to prevent the next attack till May by when the general election will have to be concluded. Do not expect any substantive action on the dismantling of terrorist infrastructure. In Davos last week, Prime Yousuf Raza Gilani said he would never allow the use of his country’s soil for terror attacks and that he was sorry about 26/11. There is nothing new in this promise except the apology which is meant for the countries whose nationals were also killed in Mumbai.
What are India’s punitive options to respond to a second attack during the life of this Government? Experts in the security and risk analysis business rate the chances of a second attack as 70:30 but 60:40 before May. They say that despite the 100 per cent deployment of security forces during Parakram in December 2001, the second terrorist attack came in May 2002, six months after the first assault.
Home Minister P Chidambaram has warned of extracting a “heavy price” from Pakistan for a repeat attack. Punitive economic and covert actions are likely to hurt more than just military means. Israel’s war against Hamas has not stopped cross border rocket attacks into Israel. Yet the most visible and least escalatory option is stand alone surgical strikes.
Writing on India’s military options in The New York Times (December 14, 2008) George Friedman chose surgical strikes against terrorist camps with area weapons (cluster bombs) as the choice least escalatory and acceptable to the US but he emphasised these would be more symbolic than effective. One notch up the scale were strikes on the ISI’s headquarters in Rawalpindi but this he rated too risky. The challenge lay in devising an option that was more than symbolic and hurt Pakistan without crossing the nuclear threshold, he said. The Indian Army’s ‘Limited War’ strategy within these parameters never materialised because Pakistan kept lowering its nuclear threshold.
During Parakram surgical strikes were approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security on December 15, 2001. Military deployment resulted from this decision on surgical strikes and not any Government orders for mobilisation. Conflicting versions on who needed more time —— the IAF or the Army —— delayed and finally cancelled the strikes. One reason cited at the time was “Pervez Musharraf to paagal hai. Yudh ho sakta hai.” Surgical strikes were considered again after the second terrorist attack on Kaluchak and called off for the same reason.
Clearly surgical strikes is one way to overcome the option of being optionless in terror and to get it off the chest. But it won’t end terrorism and our problems with Pakistan.
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