OPED | Thursday, January 14, 2010 | Email | Print | 
Close to tipping point
Rajeev Srinivasan
The Taliban and Al Qaeda have demonstrated a surprisingly sophisticated grasp of both geo-politics and tactics. It is a mistake to underestimate them as they have the ISI, which excels at covert action, to help them. After Khost, it will no longer be easy for Obama to continue with his soft approach
The Jordanian suicide bomber, Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi, who infiltrated the CIA’s Forward Base Chapman in Khost, Afghanistan and killed seven CIA operatives and his Jordanian handler on December 30, last year carried out a picture-perfect strike. Writing in the Wall Street Journal on January 7 (“The Meaning of Al Qaeda’s double agent”), former CIA agent Reuel Marc Gerecht said: “Indeed, Al Qaeda did to us exactly what we intended to do to them: Use a mole for a lethal strike against high-value targets. In the case of al-Balawi, it appears the target was Ayman al Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden’s top deputy.”
It was a brilliant operation, and the Americans were sitting ducks. The question is: Why? The fact that the CIA threw normal caution to the winds indicates American incompetence, or, chillingly, desperation. They seem to be clutching at straws, desperate for some success.
On the other hand, ever since US President Barack Obama unveiled his timetable for an American pull-out from Afghanistan, the Taliban and Al Qaeda have gone from strength to strength: The shooting of 13 soldiers at Fort Hood (although this did happen a few weeks before Mr Obama’s actual speech, the contours of the plan were known); the Christmas attempt to blow up Northwest flight 253 bound over Detroit; and then the Khost incident itself.
Aren’t all of these highly demoralising for the Americans? Even the normally placid Obama is showing the strain — he is under pressure to do something.
Going back to the Khost attack, Mr Gerecht also maintains that normal operating procedure was violated under the orders of the station chief in Khost and several regional CIA staff flew in to have a face-to-face meeting with the supposed informant; he apparently was also not subjected to the usual detailed security check. The incident shows the critical dependency of the CIA on others — for reasons of lack of language skills and of length of tenure.
The fact that the CIA underestimated the enemy’s resourcefulness and intelligence also bodes ill for the future. They should have learned that their enemy is capable of surprisingly good tactical operations, and they should have taken due care. There have been at least two previous instances where the jihadis demonstrated a clear grasp of tactics.
The first was the assassination of Ahmed Shah Massoud in his Panjshir Valley redoubt. An unquestioned military genius, Massoud had held off the formidable Soviets for years. He was assassinated in September 2001, just two days before 9/11. Massoud was the Taliban’s principal foe as the military commander of the Northern Alliance. Undoubtedly a cautious and careful man, Massoud was tricked into being interviewed by two Tunisians bearing Belgian passports, who posed as journalists — they hid a bomb in the camera.
Then there was the singular incident of the siege of Kunduz in November 2001. In this ‘Airlift of Evil’, the US allowed Pakistan to spirit away hundreds, if not thousands, of Taliban operatives cornered by the advancing Northern Alliance in Kunduz. Most of the so-called Taliban who were evacuated were senior officers of the Pakistani Army or the ISI.
Clearly, the CIA was bamboozled by the ISI and the Pakistani Army in allowing the airlift. Left to themselves, the Northern Alliance would have overrun the fort in Kunduz and captured the insurgents, thereby breaking the back of the Taliban.
These chickens have now come home to roost. The CIA has a history of strategic blunders in Afghanistan, surely because they are misled continuously by the Pakistanis. For instance, as much as 20 per cent of all the billions of CIA dollars funneled into fighting the Soviets went to the ISI’s then favourite, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who is now an implacable foe of the Americans. Now the ISI are creating myths about “good Taliban” (translation: Those who help the ISI’s agenda) and “bad Taliban” (all others). We can expect more American money to be funneled to those intent of killing Americans.
There is now great confusion about the motives of the double-agent al-Balawi. The most obvious hypothesis is that the Taliban/Al Qaeda wished to disrupt Predator and Reaper drone flights that are inconveniencing them by pinpointing their cadre from the air. The drones, as it were, rain down American wrath and have become the US’s most successful weapon and it will not be easy to abandon them and for Mr Obama to continue with his soft approach. His Cairo and Ankara speeches, his munificence to Pakistan, etc, have caused his enemies to lose respect for him. Mr Obama, the Nobel peace-prize winner, is perforce going to be a war President.
It is necessary to acknowledge that the Taliban/Al Qaeda have demonstrated a surprisingly sophisticated grasp of both geo-politics and tactics. It is a mistake to underestimate them — they have the ISI, the kings of covert action, to help them plan their operations. In this context, I was amused to come across a report from The Economist of January 24, 2009, titled “The growing, and mysterious, irrelevance of Al Qaeda”. Famous last words. A year later, it is not clear it is Al Qaeda who are irrelevant.
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