One of the most discussed subject in global strategic circles during the past few years was the proposed purpose of the Indian Air Force’s Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA). The sheer volume of purchase: 126 fighter aircraft at a speculated $18 billion was sufficient for the opening of the floodgates to intense competition. Also, since day one various motivations and implications were being linked to the entire process of finalising and procuring the aircraft.
Now, with the selection of the French firm, Dassault, as the preferred bidder for its Rafale fighter aircraft, a fresh debate has started to check the possibility of any ‘opaqueness’ in the entire deal.
It is important to appreciate that this was one of biggest major military purposes by India in the post-Bofors era. During the 1980s and 1990s much controversy arose over the purchase of Swedish 115mm Field Howitzers guns. The evidence of corruption that was unearthed created a permanent environment of suspicion over all defence deals. What exacerbated it were the preconceived notions, the self-serving perceptions on what is right and what is wrong for India’s defence promoted by arms dealers’ lobbies which individuals in government, academia and media covertly represent.
There was significant debate on the latest purchase within the country and without, but the discourse lacked strategic and technological appreciation about the proposed areal platform. The few technology based arguments put forward were found to be short on holistic appreciation of the entire process of selection. Often, selective use of data was done to either prove or disprove a point. The biggest opinion maker in this country, the media (both print and electronic) was mainly found projecting this story more as just another juicy morsel than one concerning the security of the country. Hence, even after the Rafale was declared a winner, the attempt was found to ‘discover’ flaws in the system. It appears that many journalists were actually waiting for their “Tehelka moment”.
The entire process of the selection of this aircraft was very complicated, tedious and time consuming. As per the available information in the public domain no choice of any particularly make of aircraft was projected at any point in time. It is important to note that Dassault Rafale is a Generation 4.5 fighter and so were the others that were considered.
The Rafale is a versatile jet which has recently flown bombing missions in Libya and Afghanistan. Contemporary warfare demands aerial platforms which are not only fast and highly agile but also fitted out with state of art avionics. Other important aspects for selection of an aircraft require a full satisfaction with its maintenance schedule and easy availability of spares.
As an important component of national power, IAF has a well defined task. It has to protect India’s security interests extending from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca. It is important to note that IAF needs to remain prepared to fight a conflict either with Pakistan or China. If two-front war (both Pakistan and China simultaneously) becomes a reality, then IAF would have an extremely important role to play as it is a force with a transoceanic reach.
India is a nuclear weapon state and IAF is an important constitute of country’s nuclear triad. Over the years India has moved beyond the memory of 1962 when IAF was not used due to the fear of conflict escalation. In the 21st century the story is a bit different. In modern conflict, air power would remain an important constituent to address both conventional and asymmetric threats.
IAF is upgrading its combat aircraft fleet for the past few years to enhance its operational capability. We are in an era where collateral damage in warfare has become taboo. Civilian casualties even during war are no longer acceptable. The days of indiscriminate aerial bombing are over. Modern day weaponry includes the most accurate laser guided beyond visual range (standoff) weapons. GPS-guided bombs like joint direct attack munitions (JDAMs) are going to become a part of any modern day fighting force. It also needs to be
appreciated that IAF would not be fighting any battle alone and would be plugged-in along with other fighting arms of the Indian State. Network-centric warfare is the key for the modern day combat. To undertaken these tasks IAF need a mix of various aerial platforms.
Unfortunately, the procurement of this MMRCA fleet was seen by many as more of a tool to gain geopolitical advantages than actually fit the country’s air force with the best possible aerial platform to cater to India’s strategic and tactical needs. Luckily, the agencies involved in finalising this deal were kept away from all these pressures and did a professional job. Various aircraft industries bidding for their products were using various means to make their presence felt in India. The last few years saw a flurry of conferences held in India supported by the aerospace industries. Also, a suspicious number of new “defence magazines” have popped up and nobody doubts that these are backed by the financial muscle of arms lobbies and serve as their lobbying tools.
Uncle Sam, needless to say, is most active in this last-named area. Many hearts were broken when two European companies were finally shortlisted. It is also important to note to the political fallouts of all these activities. It is probable that the US Ambassador lost his job and had to return home because he failed to deliver on the most important assignment — bagging the MMRCA deal for either Lockheed or Boeing or both.
For the recession-ridden economies of Europe and the United States, much was riding on the Indian MMRCA deal. Therefore, the foreign offices of these countries were applying much pressure on the Indian government’s approved vetting process. Yet, the entire selection process appears to have happened in a very orderly manner. This exhibits a case of healthy civil-military relationship where all defence and civilian agencies worked together for a common cause. The final decision was taken based on only two major counts: the quality of the project and the cost of the project. In a broader context, India has proved that the defence industry could also be a buyer’s market.
Globally, on various occasions it has been found that quality and the cost of the product are not the only criteria’s for defence procurements. Strategic and economic interests, pressures of bilateral relationships, political calculations, tension between public goods and private ends, corporate greed etc play a significant role in defence purchases. But the Rafale selection looks to be an extremely professional exercise and India was able to withstand various hidden pressures. All this clearly indicates the boost in India’s global standing which eventually made it possible for the state to take a decision on its own terms.
The writer is an IDSA Fellow
