Recently Declassified documents show that lal Bahadur Shashtri was scheduled to visit the US after signing the Tashkent pact in 1966

For former Prime Minister lal Bahadur Shastri was scheduled to have a high-profile visit to the United States but that never happened. He was to visit the US after signing the Tashkent Declaration. Although it was planned twice within his brief tenure, it was not destined to be. The first was planned for June 1965, one year after Shastri took over as the Prime Minister, but then US President lyndon Johnson postponed it to January 31-February 5, 1966. Had Shastri lived, he would have made his first visit to the US as a triumphant Indian leader in 1966.

Declassified documents by the US show details of these intended visits. Now that there is much hype about the commemoration of the India-Pakistan war of 1965, in which Shastri played a crucial role, it will be interesting to look back and assess his role in the war.

Although the Americans were not sure how Shastri would handle foreign affairs, Johnson invited Shastri soon after he took over as Prime Minister in June 1964, and the latter accepted. Shastri wanted the visit to happen in October 1966, but Khan too had to visit the US around the same time. Johnson postponed both their visits.

US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, informed the US Ambassador in India, Chester Bowles, and said that President Johnson desired to postpone the visits of Ayub and Shastri in view of his pre-occupation with southwest Asia as well as the legislative agenda. Johnson also wrote a polite letter to Shastri explaining, “In these circumstances, long-term interest of the two countries and our ability to pursue them jointly would be better served if you come in the Fall after the Congress has adjourned. I have, therefore, reluctantly come to the conclusion that the next month or two would not be the right time for us to exchange thoughts on our long range plans and aspirations.”

Strangely, Ambassador Bowles heard of this postponement only when his aide handed over a bulletin from the Pakistan radio. When he called Washington, DC, to ascertain the facts, the answer that came back from the White House was this: “This means what it says. The President is very tired and is over laden and he has too many obligations and can’t carry them out.”

When Ambassadow Bowles met Shastri the same night, he had a “horrible” talk with the Prime Minister who was deeply hurt. Bowels in his oral history said that if he had been given enough time, he would have handled the situation better. He could have told Shastri that since he wanted to come in October, he (Bowels) had advised the White House to change it to October. Shastri would have been pleased and the bitterness could have been avoided. But the news came from Pakistan.

The White House proposed the visit for the second time after Bowels persuaded Shastri and his wife to make a visit. Bowles was keen that Shastri visit Washington to clear the misunderstanding, if any. Shastri told Bowels that he would like his visit to be planned before that of Ayub Khan, pointing out sarcastically, “I am sure that the State Department has no desire to see me.” The US Ambassador attributed this to various reasons including the lingering bitterness of the earlier postponement. Shashtri resented the US bracketing him with Khan. Bowles recommended to the White House that an earlier visit for Shastri was desirable. 

After the India-Pakistan ceasefire, from November 1965, preparations for the January ‘business-like’ visit began. Washington appreciated Shastri’s mature way of handling the war. Bowles reported to Washington that, “At least it is clear, we are not dealing with a mad man who is about to fly off on an emotional tangent.”

When Bowles met Shastri before Christmas, he told him that he’d finalise his talking points after his return from Tashkent and asked Bowels what the US expected from Tashkent summit. The Ambassador said, “We made it a point not to recommend any particular solution. Our concern was to get the air cleared so that both India and Pakistan could get on with the business of economic development.” However, Washington was keeping a close watch on the Tashkent talks, allowing the Soviets to mediate.

Shastri was one of the six Indian Prime Ministers who did not go to the US during his term. The others were Gulzarilal Nanda, Charan Singh, VP Singh, Chandrasekhar, and HD Deve Gowda. Gulzarilal Nanda, Charan Singh and Chandrasekhar had a very brief tenure.