Should United Nations peacekeepers use force only in self-defence or ought they be allowed to use it to protect civilians and neutralise peace spoilersIJ
The United Nations (UN) has always been hesitant to allow peacekeepers deployed on missions to use force. Such a stance makes sense if we take into account three key principles — or the ‘holy trinity' on which traditional peacekeeping was founded; the consent of the member-state party to the conflict, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defense. The principle of non-use of force except in cases of self-defence, in particular, has generated extended debates on whether United Nations peacekeeping (UNPK) missions should strictly adhere to this principle or should peacekeepers be allowed to use force to protect civilians and neutralise ‘peace spoilers'. While UN forces deployed on peacekeeping missions have always had the right to use force for self-defence, the use of force has been a source of unending controversy in peacekeeping operations. On one hand while the three peacekeeping operations in which UN forces did use force — Congo (1960-1963), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1995) and Somalia (1993-1995), proved to be devastating experiences for the UN; no force at all, such as in missions like Rwanda, has also had a detrimental impact on the belief that peacekeeping missions can stabilise States embroiled in conflicts.
In today's context, where force is increasingly used by peacekeepers to diffuse tense situations, it becomes important to clarify whether the use of force and a more ‘robust' approach by the UNPK can assist in improving the UN's credibility, especially when peaceful means of settlement have failed. Over the years, the failure of UN missions such as in Rwanda has prompted the UN to allow a more ‘robust' approach in peacekeeping. And despite reservations on part of the member states, a more ‘robust' approach was adopted in 2009 with the ‘New Partnership Agenda', according to which force can be used to defend the UN mandate and protect civilians.
This approach has allowed the UN forces to use a significant amount of force against armed groups disrupting the peace process. It has also allowed peacekeeping to become more ‘people-centric' and ‘field-centric'. For instance, because UN missions deployed in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Mali have been given the exclusive mandate to use force against armed groups to fulfill the mission mandate, these missions are more ‘robust' in nature, adopt stabilisation of the region as their mission goal and most importantly, are more focused on protecting civilians amidst ongoing conflicts. The new mandates have brought about a qualitative change because of the emphasis on the use of force when it comes to protecting civilian lives and protecting territorial integrity.
The importance of this approach or the lack thereof since the beginning of 2018 can be illustrated through the example of the UN mission in the DRC. Despite the growing threats to Congolese civilians over the past few years, the troop levels in the mission were dramatically reduced in March and its budget cut by eight per cent in June. This has, in turn, resulted in the mission adopting a new strategy, with more focus on mobility rather than on civilian protection. Because of this, the security situation in a number of areas in the DRC is deteriorating and an increasing number of civilian lives are being put at risk. And since the current situation in DRC seems to be worsening with time, a more active peacekeeping presence is needed in several districts of the country, such as in the Ituri District as well as in the provinces of South Kivu and Katanga. Without the support of the UNPK forces, it is unlikely that the country will stabilise in the near future.
Keeping in mind that most active UN missions today are deployed in intra-state conflicts, it then becomes imperative for UNPK forces to use force not only in self-defence but also in situations where civilians need to be protected from armed groups. It is often also necessary for peacekeeping forces to use force in order to make violent rebel and insurgent groups to come to the negotiations table. For instance, when the UN peacekeeping mission in DRC was given offensive authority, the largest violent insurgent group surrendered within months. The mandate to use force also enforces belief in the peacekeeping forces, for if the peacekeepers were to be stripped of the mandate to use force and their presence made out to seem ineffective, the chances are that their presence will have a minimal effect on the outcome of the conflict and the peace process.
UN missions like the one in DRC illustrate why the active use of force is more beneficial than the use of force only in cases of self-defence. Without such a stance, it would be impossible to ensure that such regions stabilise in a manner to not fall back into the same situation again when peacekeeping forces leave. More ‘robust' UNPK forces have the ability to intervene in violent situations, ensure rehabilitation, infrastructure development, ensure a peaceful establishment/transfer of power and lastly, ensure civilian protection. The failure to use this approach can have a devastating outcome, as is evidenced by the case of Rwanda in 1994, where despite incoming information about the increasingly violent nature of the unrest, UN peacekeepers were instructed to not use force and ultimately, to withdraw, thereby resulting in the deaths of thousands of people.
And though, where possible, alternatives such as the involvement of regional organisations in military conflicts must be looked at, use of force by peacekeepers in complex and violent situations can ultimately help in ensuring stability and peace in the region.
(The writer is a student, Sciences Po, london School of Economics & Political Science)
