While Baghdadi has been eliminated, the US has to tackle the battle of perceptions in negating the idea that gives rise to forces like the Taliban, IS or Al Qaeda
US President Donald Trump’s over-enthusiastic and cinematic description of the end of Islamic State (IS) leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi notwithstanding, the global reaction to the latest counter-terror operation was more nuanced and balanced. The global “war on terror”, which officially started in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, has continuously evolved and mutated to include the likes of the IS and has sub-designated subsequent operational initiatives. Take for example, Operation Inherent Resolve.
Irrespective of nomenclature and terror organisations involved, the “war on terror” has been conducted with numerous international powers, regional nations and sectarian militias, who often worked at cross-purposes. This chessboard-like landscape frequently distracted various forces from focussing on the principal terror organisation ie, IS and, instead, checkmated each other, while delaying the decimation of the IS’s infrastructure and leadership. Such an unaligned environment compromised on the operational efficacy of the “war on terror” and most importantly allowed social justifications to the terror organisations to perpetuate their perverse logic.
The capture of Osama bin Laden in 2011 did not automatically amount to neutralising the very idea of Al Qaeda, which has since survived in various metastasising inspirations and formats across the world. Ironically, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was himself taking cover in a territory in the Idlib province that was controlled by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which itself is an affiliate of Al Qaeda. Even the demise of Bin Laden eight years ago, the subsequent naming and shaming of his atrocities and the emergence of the more dominant IS formation could not completely obliterate the “idea” of this terrorist organisation. In the fight against terror, the maxim, “one terrorist killed gives rise to two new terrorists”, holds true unless the “idea” of terror itself is addressed and not just the foot-soldiers of the “idea.” Many Al Qaeda affiliates today bear little resemblance or connection with each other, let alone any form of coordination. Yet, the “idea” has inspired terror organisations in West Africa, North Africa, Somalia, Spain, the Afghan-Pak region to organisations as far as the Philippines.
Former US President Barack Obama was more restrained, realistic and clinical in handling the “taking out” of Osama bin Laden as he presumably realised both the enormity of the act and yet the limitations of the same in ending the “war on terror” that necessitated a more fundamental change of societal perceptions. Obama had recognised the importance of remaining “inclusive” and not giving into blustering rhetoric when he presciently stated that “his (Osama’s) death does not mark the end of our effort. There’s no doubt that Al Qaeda will continue to pursue attacks against us.” He sagaciously added, “We must also reaffirm that the US is not — and never will be — at war with Islam. I’ve made clear, just as President Bush did shortly after 9/11, that our war is not against Islam. Bin Laden was not a Muslim leader; he was a mass murderer of Muslims. Indeed, Al Qaeda has slaughtered scores of Muslims in many countries, including our own. So his demise should be welcomed by all who believe in peace and human dignity.”
No such reassuring tone or emotion was at display in Trump’s moment when Baghdadi was killed. He gloated inelegantly about the terrorist “crying, screaming and whimpering” besides adding that Baghdadi “died like a dog.” In a polarised world, increasing voices of “us versus them” played out openly. This conveniently and unfairly lumped people together by virtue of their religiosity, nationality or even the topical status as US “allies.” In this backdrop, the opportunity to honour the moment by talking about the regressive “idea” that besets terrorism in a sensitive way was lost to the usual urgency of self-aggrandisement by Trump.
While the end of Baghdadi is an important milestone, it was almost foretold with his organisation getting diminished considerably in the recent past. Importantly, the genesis of both the Al Qaeda earlier and IS later was based on extreme anti-Americanism, a sentiment that had festered in the region for long and one that was exploited by these terror organisations.
In 1997, Osama bin Laden had said, “As a result of an arrogant atmosphere, the US has today set a double standard, calling whoever goes against its injustice a terrorist.” A potent mix of the prevailing sense of injustice, ignorance and religious benefaction was maliciously invoked by such-like forces, ably aided by the belligerence of the US actions that persisted with the “us versus them” divide. This fundamental battle of perceptions between the US’ efforts and the locals in conflict zones is an age-old one with America repeatedly displaying very limited and selfish objectives, then bolting out immediately on achieving them and leaving a dangerous vacuum that is often filled by the likes of IS. This selfish short-sightedness of the US is what germinated the Taliban after it vacated Afghanistan in the early 1990s and this is exactly what germinated the IS when it vacated Iraq (after Saddam Hussein’s hanging) at the hands of sectarian militias.
As the most dominant interventionist in global conflicts, the US has to tackle the battle of perceptions in negating the “idea” that gives rise to forces like the Taliban, IS or Al Qaeda. The not-so-subtle mention of the “Muslim ban” during the presidential question and answer session following Baghdadi’s killing was exactly the sort of contextualisation that is unhelpful, unwarranted and unfair.
All the historical injustices, discrimination and double-standards that were committed by the colonists earlier and by the US more recently, are the critical closure-points that can negate the “idea”, rather than just the elimination of terrorists. History of all successful counter-insurgency closures in the world point out the change in perception of the locals, which then results in the suffocation of any local support system for the terror infrastructure to survive. Till that happens, the killing of any terrorist, however senior in ranking, is still just a statistic.
(The writer, a military veteran, is a former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Puducherry)
