The Chinese President has failed to meet economic targets and is facing a challenge to his authority. Any pullback by the PLA will be viewed as a defeat, negating his second goal of a stronger military
The 12-hour military commander-level meeting, the first after the five-point consensus at Moscow, has once again ended with all indicators pointing towards a stalemate. India, on its part, is buoyed with the brilliant pre-emptive tactical actions on August 29-30, leading to gaining control of dominating tactical features on our side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) on the southern bank of Pangong Tso. This was followed by readjustments of defences on the northern bank, gaining domination over the Fingers area where the Chinese have transgressed and are unwilling to restore status quo antebellum.
The manoeuvres of the Indian Army have empowered the Indian negotiators to hold parleys from a position of strength. However, China, through its mouthpiece, Global Times, and other State-owned and controlled media, remains in constant denial mode, blaming India instead for the current military stand-off. Despite the Chinese claims, Xi Jinping, the Chinese President and strongman, is acknowledged globally as the aggressor in pursuance of his cherished dream of becoming the strongest and the most powerful world leader.
The Indian stand so far has been determined, consistent and firm. India has outrightly rejected the Chinese suggestion of “meeting halfway.” India rightly insists on its demand of “first-in, first-out,” considering the fact that it was the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops who violated the established agreements and protocols and made multi-pronged transgressions into our territory in eastern Ladakh in early May. The PLA is also guilty of not adhering to the decisions arrived at during the first Corps Commanders meeting on June 5 for de-escalation and dis-engagement, leading to the ugly clashes at Galwan.
The Galwan clashes, resulting in fatalities on both sides, made India and the world realise that it was a well-planned cartographic aggression by the Chinese with the express consent of the Central Military Commission (CMC) led by Xi. The obstinate attitude displayed by the Chinese thereafter proves beyond doubt that the final decision will also be taken by none other than Xi whose “China dream” and personal ambition are stake.
Xi is a career politician, privileged to have been born with a “Red spoon” in his mouth. His father, Xi Zhongxun, was “Red royalty”, a hero of the Communist revolution who later fell out with Mao Zedong, according to Ananth Krishnan, an acknowledged China-watcher. After the purging of his father, Xi was shifted to rural China from the privileged living in Central Beijing, the area earmarked for the then Chinese elite. Xi struggled thereafter to enter the youth wing of the Communist Party and the final acceptance into the party is well-documented and an example of focussed determination, perseverance and hardship. Despite being born into the “Red royalty,” he was not parachuted to the top and had to struggle his way through at every stage. His initial background and subsequent struggle to rise to power had made him ambitious and adamant.
Xi took over the reins of the party when it was in a disarray. He, therefore, began to consolidate his power and gradually became all-powerful through complete centralisation of authority. He brought to an end the “collective leadership” system in the Communist Party of China (CPC). He not only managed to gain hold of all the top three posts in China but also had a resolution passed for abolishing the President’s term limit, enabling him to rule indefinitely. This act of his has not gone down well with the young and aspiring leaders within the CPC who see a dark future for them with bleak chances of rising to the top. Like all authoritarian leaders, Xi, too, has a fair number of dissidents and domestic opponents.
During his consolidation of power among other things, he has relied a lot upon emphasis on ideology and nationalism. Xi believes that the communist ideology must prevail upon everything else among the Chinese populace. The “3 W” strategy enunciated for the PLA is aimed at promoting and ensuring compliance of the ideology.
The PLA, as is well-known, is not a national army but the army of the CPC. Moreover, Xi’s reliance on the indoctrinated cadre of the United Front Work Department over career diplomats, while appointing ambassadors to South Asian and other target countries, indicates his preference for ideology over diplomacy to carry forward his pet Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project. Xi has also given a new image of aggressiveness and assertiveness to the Chinese diplomacy through “wolf warrior” diplomats. He wants to be recognised as the most powerful Chinese leader by challenging the supremacy of the American President.
To fulfil his ambition and imbibe nationalism, Xi has announced his roadmap in what is referred to as the “China Dream.”
“President Xi’s dream is of a stronger nation with a strong military,” according to Liu Mingfu, a retired Chinese colonel and author. The underlying idea behind the “China Dream” is to restore the ex-Middle Kingdom’s glory and regain the Chinese supremacy through expansionism. It is also aimed at minimising internal dissension through national unity. Xi’s ambition is to make China not only stronger but assertive as well. This is a very critical year for Xi in his roadmap for realising the “China Dream” by 2049, the centenary year of the People’s Republic of China. There are two intermediary goalposts in 2021 and 2025. This year is the launchpad for 2021, the 100th anniversary of the CPC. Xi had promised the nation that by 2020 he would ensure poverty relief by bringing all Chinese above the poverty line and strengthen national defence and the Chinese armed forces.
However, the Chinese economy had begun to show a downward trend in 2019 itself when China’s growth dropped to its slowest pace in nearly three decades. With the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, Xi was certain that he would not be able to meet his promised economic targets in 2020. Despite the bold face being put up by China, it is certain that its economy is undergoing a crisis. The banking system is the worst-hit, with growing unemployment and disrupted global supply chains adding to the pressure.
The centralisation works well as long as the going is good. But in times of crisis, many dissenting voices are raised. Xi is now facing a similar situation at home. As is evident, nothing moves in China without his approval or consent. Xi has obviously failed to meet his promised economic targets to remove poverty and is facing a huge challenge to his authority. Any pullback at this time by the PLA troops will be viewed as a defeat for China, thus negating his second goalpost as well of a stronger military.
Can Xi at this juncture afford to take this risk and relent? That is why the Chinese media is talking of a “long haul” through the winters. Xi’s calculation is based on the premise that a prolonged deployment would affect the Indian economy more than the Chinese one. He is mistaken. India stands unitedly to safeguard its territorial integrity and would not yield till China vacates from the transgressed areas. On the other hand, he is faced with growing dissension at home.
Despite the propaganda unleashed by the State-controlled media of the invincibility of the PLA forces, Xi is uncertain of an assured victory. Even a stalemate would be viewed as an Indian victory and a Chinese failure. There is no dearth of dissenters at home waiting for his failure and ensure that he doesn’t get a second chance. Xi is faced with a dilemma of relent or retreat. Knowing the ambitious persona of Xi, he is unlikely to yield ground to his dissenters so easily. Rather than being forced to resign, he would prefer to relent at an opportune time and order the PLA to vacate. How and when is a matter of negotiations and timing. Meanwhile, India should not dither under any circumstances.
(The author is a Jammu-based veteran, political commentator and security and strategic analyst. The views expressed are personal.)
