While its ties with China are transactional, it has to get past the latter’s economic heft to rationalise India’s stand
The Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral front, ostensibly to fob off the preponderance of the US and the EU, is now being tested with its inherent pulls and pressures. China’s ingress at Ladakh’s Galwan Valley, the killing of 20 of our Army personnel and its adamant claim on our territory have posited India at a knife-point so precarious that this unique strategic partnership is in jeopardy. While India has used the RIC to emphasise the need for respecting each other’s sovereignty, China is pressuring Russia to scale down its defence supplies to us in view of the border escalation. Caught in the middle, Russia is delicately trying to assuage both without upsetting the autonomous bilateral relationship each nation has harboured with it. Neither can it boldly announce one-sided mediation like US President Donald Trump — and it has already clarified that both nations were evolved enough and have mechanisms to settle issues — nor can it take a loaded position to the detriment of the other side. Yet it has the unenviable job of holding together regional alliances like the RIC and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) to offset US unilateralism. And though it has of late taken note of India’s increasing strategic tilt towards the US to counter China’s mega ambitions in the region, it also needs India to counterbalance itself against Chinese heft. Besides, as a vibrant democracy, India is its best bet for creating a multi-lateral narrative. If defence ties and shared ideologies define much of its engagement with India, with China it is transactional economics. China has invested heavily in Russian infrastructure and even funded Russian gas lines for a guaranteed 30-year supply, besides working on an East-West transport corridor to Europe and opening up the Arctic Circle route. In fact, ever since its relations with the US were tested following allegations of electoral interference in the 2016 presidential polls, Moscow has got closer to the US’ bugbear, China. In contrast, the Indo-Russian relationship relies much on historicity and emotion.
Ever since the Cold War, Moscow has remained our close ally and dominated the defence trade, providing everything from heavy duty equipment to spare parts, something which culminated in the landmark $5.4 billion S-400 deal. India stuck to this last deal despite overwhelming pressure from the US and threats of sanctions and Russia acknowledges that. Just as it is aware that India is one of its largest importers of crude oil and LNG. However, there has not been much growth in our non-defence trade. Though both sides have now agreed to scale up trade to $30 billion by 2025, bilateral trade between Russia and China has already gone way past, registering a record high of $110 billion last year. And while India has sided with the US-led Quad alliance to tame China in the Pacific region, it has recently stepped up investment in the Russian far-east to strengthen its economic footprint. In acknowledgement, Russia invited Prime Minister Narendra Modi as the chief guest at the fifth Eastern Economic Forum (EEF). Besides business delegations, four of our Chief Ministers also attended, identifying synergies in sectors such as diamond-cutting, petrochemicals, IT, wood-processing and tourism. But the most important development was the development of a maritime corridor between Chennai and Vladivostok that would significantly boost bilateral trade. New economic partnerships are an indication that India is keen to alter the stasis that had set in old ties and wants to keep Russia invested in current geo-strategic contexts. And considering that Russia supported the abrogation of Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir as being “carried out within the framework of the Indian Constitution” despite both US and China opposing it, Russia can still play a crucial role in containing any adverse fallout of the Indo-China border tension. In fact, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Morgulov called up the Indian ambassador post-Galwan and recorded the clash in clinical language, as “developments on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) on the border between Indian and China in the Himalayas.” Russia is keeping itself updated about the sensitivities involved and the fact that Defence Minister Rajnath Singh decided to attend the RIC meeting and the Moscow Victory Parade despite the COVID pandemic is indication of the strategic depth India attaches to Russia. It also hopes that Russia could calm China into respecting status quo at the border. The challenge for India will be to not rile the US too much, which is hot-chasing both Russia and China over democracy restoration in their troublespots and rights issues. If Russia, compromised economically as it is, isn’t able to convince China, then we would still need the US to internationalise and diplomatically scale up China’s wanton game.
