China’s failed video war

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China’s failed video war

Monday, 15 June 2020 | Anil Gupta

China’s failed video war

Beijing adopted Sun Tzu’s strategy of ‘winning without fighting' little realising that India is the land of the grand strategist Krishna and political adviser Chanakya

Amid the continuing military stand-off in Ladakh and a series of failed bilateral meetings at varying military-diplomatic levels, Beijing embarked upon the familiar “video war”, releasing clips showcasing China’s modernised and digitised  military prowess. The video, released a few days before the scheduled Corps Commander-level meeting, featured a task force doing “infiltration drills.” It showed troops operating at night, crossing the border in the dark to avoid detection with only a laser to guide them and the destruction of en route threats through drones. It showed a sniper team destroying enemy spotlights and a fire strike team neutralising the enemy’s light armoured vehicles with anti-tank rockets. Thus the enemy’s defences were neutralised and thereafter the task force launched the final assault on the enemy headquarters, in which a vehicle-mounted infrared reconnaissance system was used to guide the troops to accurately lock on the targets and destroy them.

The exercise, as per the Chinese mouthpiece Global Times, was done at 4,700 metres, simulating the border with India, deep in the Tanggula mountains. However, seasoned defence strategists and military experts in India were not impressed by it as the video had glaring mistakes. Apart from not displaying the timeline, the troops were wearing summer combat fatigues and not the winter clothing essential to survive at that altitude. China watchers, who refused to be misled by the Chinese media, revealed that a similar video was released by Beijing in July 2017 at the peak of the Doklam crisis. Only it was claimed to be filmed at a different altitude then.

To grasp why the Chinese media resorts to such tactics and propaganda offensives, we have to understand the Chinese strategy of “winning without fighting.” It goes to the credit of the Chinese army that it has not depended on foreign armies to define its military doctrine but has used indigenous knowledge and experience to draft its war strategy.

China is a one-party State with undisputed supremacy of the Communist Party of China (CPC). The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is the army of the communist party and not of the State. It has a political task to defend China’s national interest which entails providing “strategic support for consolidating the leadership of the CPC and the socialist system.” It is the legacy of Mao’s Red Army, which was “an armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution.” The PLA is controlled by the CPC through the Central Military Commission (CMC) and the Chinese security doctrine as enunciated by the CMC is referred to as “political warfare.”

Adhering to Chinese general and military strategist Sun Tzu’s dictum of “winning without waging a war”, the CPC’s Central Committee and the CMC have laid out the concept of “Three Warfares” as a set of codes for the PLA to conduct political warfare. Referred to as the “political work guidelines of the PLA” the “Three Warfares” strategy entails: Public opinion warfare (through the media), psychological warfare and legal warfare. Their main focus is on control of public opinion; psychological warfare to include blunting an adversary’s determination; transformation of emotions; psychological guidance; collapse of (an adversary’s) organisation; psychological defence and restriction through law.

Of the three strategies, two have direct bearing on subverting the enemy, playing mind games, coercion and psychological domination using different platforms. It is a subset of the more widely-known “Information Warfare.” It aims at shaping the international image of China by influencing foreign decision-makers’ perceptions and their approach towards Beijing. It is operated by means of pre-conflict posturing by the military/paramilitary forces or application of other national capabilities (diplomatic, economic, and cultural) with the intention of intimidating adversaries and encouraging acquiescence to Beijing-desired outcomes.

These are not just used against an adversary but also citizens and friendly countries, for building public opinion favourable to the CPC and perception management. In doing so, the well-tried policy of “carrot and stick” is scrupulously adhered to. The same is very visible in the current stand-off as well. A careful scanning of various articles, videos and tweets emanating from China related to the current face-off bears testimony to the fact. These can easily be termed as instruments of propaganda warfare. Most are prepared under simulated conditions not only to scare the adversary but to motivate the PLA since morale is a big issue with the Chinese armed forces.

With this in mind, the Central Committee of the CPC has given the responsibility of implementing China’s “Three Warfares” strategy to the Political Work Department after the recent organisational reforms. The department, which is subordinate to the CMC, works in coordination with the PLA with the aim to create and safeguard the legitimacy of the CPC’s political power from any international as well as domestic threat.

Another facet of psychological operations is sowing discord and a sense of hopelessness in the adversary nation’s army and populace. Not only will this help in breaking their will to fight off adversary forces and demoralise the population, it will discourage resistance in case of an actual conflict and promote mental fatigue and demoralisation in case of a longish stand-off. This also helps in seeking concessions at the negotiating table. “When one defeats the enemy, it is not solely by killing the enemy, or winning a piece of ground, but is mainly in terms of cowing his heart.” In order to undermine the opponent’s morale, the Chinese believe in pedalling information favourable to oneself through various forms of media as well as through third parties, friendly elements in the opponent’s society and similar outlets.

Fortunately, the current face-off has exposed many such Chinese moles in our society, including veterans, columnists and defence analysts. They spared no effort to multiply the Chinese effort but were defeated in their efforts to create the “China bogey” by those who wanted the nation to ignore the alarmist and exaggerated reporting which has been  proved wrong.

The Chinese, in their bid to coerce India, launched a full-fledged “psychological operation” but had to eat humble pie. The mirror deployment by the Indian Army, the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Navy took the Chinese by surprise. Coupled with this is the firm and rock-solid politico-diplomatic stand taken by India that has not only rattled the Chinese but sent them a clear-cut message regarding the “no-nonsense” approach of the Indian Government.

In order to buy time, China has been insisting on a series of meetings so that it can prolong the face-off because early resolution would hit its global image. An important meeting was held at the Moldo post (opposite the Indian post of Chusul) between the two delegations led by the Corps Commanders. Even before the outcome of the meeting was known, the PLA once again resorted to mind games by releasing a video displaying China’s operational readiness, mobilisation and capability of switching combat-ready troops from one theatre of command to another.

A couple of days later it was revealed that both armies have agreed to disengage from a few areas and also pull back additional troops and weapon platforms deployed on their side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The intent of the video is now becoming clearer. The Indian side would have asserted to their counterparts the local superiority enjoyed by our forces in the designated areas. The video was meant as a counter but failed to have the desired impact because India is in a better position to muster a larger number of fully-acclimatised combat-ready troops.

Thereafter the pullback took place. Interestingly, it has now been acknowledged by a Chinese military expert Huang Guozhi in a Chinese military magazine that, “At present the world’s largest and most experienced country with plateau and mountain troops is neither the US, Russia nor any European powerhouse, but India.”

The timing and content of the article written in Mandarin is self-explanatory. Global Times, the CPC’s mouth-piece, writes in English and is obviously not meant for the larger domestic audience.

China must be thinking of emulating Sun Tzu by adopting his strategy of “winning without fighting” against New Delhi without realising that India is the land of the grand strategist Krishna and political adviser  Chanakya.

India cannot be browbeaten nor subverted through a motivated media war because it has the capacity and capability to stand firm and resolute.  China needs to realise that it is in the interest of both nations to resolve the boundary dispute through mutual negotiations and concentrate the comprehensive national power towards building stronger economies in a post-Coronavirus era.

(The author is a Jammu-based veteran, political analyst, columnist, security and strategic analyst. The views expressed are personal.)

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