Though New Delhi belatedly began back-channelling the Taliban, it must now explore all possible options to checkmate it in sync with Iran
In his Twelve Dilemmas Behind the UK’s Afghan Defeat, diplomat-journalist Tim Willasey-Wilsey dwells on the familiar lessons: No clarity of purpose, wrong enemy, mission creep…. but the unilateral US decision of withdrawal with minimal consultation with the UK is the most telling. Some 475 British soldiers died courageously defending Lashkargah in Helmand province, assisted by sniffer dogs that included Theo who won a bravery medal posthumously after the Springer Spaniel died from undiagnosed seizure hours after his handler Lance Corporal Tasker was killed in a firefight. Helmand is about to fall, and will be the seventh provincial capital to succumb to Taliban. Lessons not mentioned by Willasey-Wilsey are: Despite 20 years of battling by combined forces of the US, Nato and ANSF (nearly 500,000), the 50,000
Taliban were never significantly degraded and the capabilities of ANSF and police not operationally enhanced. Airpower that has proved pivotal in combat was curiously not conferred on Afghan Air Force, probably due to objections by Pakistan. Consequently, the less effective over-the-horizon air support for ANSF is not hurting.
The Washington Post published a series of revealing articles called ‘Afghanistan Papers’ in which the US Commanders exaggerated battlefield successes, even suggested victory was close. Similarly, the capability of ANSF was depicted in excess of reality. Lt Gen Mark Milley, Commander US Forces in Afghanistan in 2013, said: “The Afghan Army and police are very, very effective in combat.” As Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, he seems less confident about them. The Special Inspector General of Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), established to investigate waste and fraud, exceeded its brief. Besides audit, in 2014 it produced ‘Lessons Learnt’. Its most famous quotation is by James Dobbins, former US envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan: “We don’t invade poor countries to make them rich. We don’t invade authoritarian countries to make them democratic. We invade violent countries to make them peaceful and we clearly failed in Afghanistan.” SIGAR certified in 2014 that ANSF was able to conduct operations independently and withstand Taliban attacks. So, when Kunduz fell in 2015 (and again in 2016), all hell broke loose. Inflating ANSF combat capabilities was apparently done on the direction of the Pentagon higher-ups. Another failure on ISAF’s part was not focusing on police training and involving too many Nato trainers.
Speaking at Wilson Centre, Washington, Pakistan’s NSA Moeed Yusuf said Islamabad’s leverage with Taliban reduced with US withdrawal and Taliban’s combat victories. Chairman, Pakistan’s Senate Defence Committee, Mushahid Hussain characterised Pakistan’s core interests in Afghanistan with four Noes: no cross-border terrorism from Afghanistan; no military solution; no acceptance of more refugees; and no tolerance for presence of 6,500 Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Afghanistan. Will Taliban’s blitzkrieg result in cracks in ANSF and collapse of Kabul? Taliban controls more than half of Afghanistan’s 419 districts, surrounds half the 34 provincial capitals (captured six of them and leans on Lashkargah and Kandahar) and controls crossings on all its borders. In a shift in strategy, Taliban is now going for urban centres and fighting in cities, resulting in civilian casualties and IDPs.
India has been excluded from the third regional meeting of the extended troika — US, Russia, China and Pakistan, organised by Russia. Dropping India, says Russia, is due to its inability to influence the situation in Afghanistan (read Taliban). New Delhi belatedly began back-channelling Taliban but Islamabad’s leverage over it and others in the troika has kept it out of the ORBAT. Instead, last week it used its presidency of UNSC in August to hold discussion on Afghanistan whereas an emergency session was required calling for an end to violence and sanctioning Taliban leadership. India is exploring another route to checkmate Taliban — Iran. Foreign Minister Javad Zarif has said Islamic Emirate is a threat to Iran and India and existential threat to Pakistan. He passed more or less the same strictures on Taliban at this year’s Raisina Dialogue. Iran too is not a part of the Extended Troika at US behest. India has another opportunity to reset relations with Iran, disturbed by Trump’s sanctions affecting oil, supplies, investment in Chabahar and gas fields in Iran.
It is high time India puts its relations with Afghanistan in high gear in sync with Iran, which has close links with Taliban. Except Mazar-e-Sharif, India has closed down its consulates at Jalalabad, Kandahar and Herat. High brick walls protect the Indian Embassy in Kabul’s Green Zone. The four-part strategic partnership with Afghanistan (October 2011), the first Kabul signed with any country, must be reactivated, especially defence cooperation. India must augment Afghan Air Force airpower capability by all feasible means, including its airbase in Tajikistan maintained by IAF which it shares with Russia. Calls for evacuating 3,000 Indian nationals are growing louder but, most of all, Delhi must urgently help Kabul in containing Taliban by overt and covert mechanisms.
Time has also come for US/Afghanistan to act against Quetta Shura, the Baradar-Doha gang, and Pakistan’s ISI who have held Kabul hostage for decades unless regime change is being allowed by a State-sponsored terrorist organisation which calls itself Taliban.
(The writer, a retired Major General, was Commander, IPKF South, Sri Lanka, and founder member of the Defence Planning Staff, currently the Integrated Defence Staff. The views expressed are personal.)
