The 2025 BRICS Summit, held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, concluded with a sprawling 47-page long declaration addressing diverse global and regional issues. The document, filled with terms like “multipolar world,” “Global South,” and “inclusive economic globalisation,” reflects the coalition’s long term desire to reshape the larger international political and economic system. However, these objectives are overshadowed by US President Donald Trump’s aggressive stance toward the group, internal contradictions within BRICS, and a rapidly evolving global order that challenges the forum’s relevance. Moreover, the absence of Chinese President in the Summit, for the first time in BRICS history, and virtual presence of Putin also added to depleting political multilateralism. The shift toward bilateralism in global politics reflects a pragmatic response to a fragmented international system and weak global governing frameworks, where nations tailored agreements and issue based alliance over any multilateral framework. The 2025 Rio Declaration, while comprehensive, lacks ‘actionable solutions’ to the challenges posed by Trump’s policies. The global order remains largely disruptive by diverse political and economic forces which remain beyond control of any kind of multilateralism.
After his election to American presidency, Trump labeled BRICS as an “anti-American” alliance and threatened a 10 per cent tariff on any country aligning with its policies. The US has long leveraged its control over global financial systems, notably through the exclusion of Iran (2012) and Russia (2022) from the SWIFT network. This “weaponisation” of finance has driven BRICS nations to explore alternatives to dollar dominance. Russia and China, for instance, have increasingly traded in their domestic currencies. In 2022, Russia proposed a new reserve currency based on a basket of BRICS currencies, though the group clarified in 2024 that it does not aim to replace the dollar but to offer a “viable alternative” for market efficiency and inclusive globalisation. Ironically, Trump’s policies may be doing more to dismantle the US-led global order than BRICS. His push to reform the Bretton Woods institutions, such as the World Bank and IMF, aligns with BRICS’ calls for change but stems from a unilateral agenda. Trump’s trade policies threaten the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which BRICS claims to support, yet leading members like China, Vietnam, and India are negotiating bilateral trade deals with the US to protect their own interests. These negotiations, often under pressure from Trump’s tariffs, highlight the forum’s inability to present a united front. Originally comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, BRICS expanded in October 2024 to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE. Indonesia joined in January 2025, bringing the total to ten nations. Representing 45 per cent of the global population and over 35 per cent of global GDP, BRICS wields significant economic clout. The Kazan Summit in October 2024 formalised this expansion, signaling the group’s intent to amplify its voice in ‘global governance’ model and its reform.
Despite this growth, BRICS faces internal challenges. The coalition’s diverse membership brings conflicting interests. For example, India’s security concerns regarding China outweigh its issues with US hegemony. Similarly, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, alongside the US and Israel, are wary of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, another BRICS member. These tensions undermine the group’s ability to act cohesively.
The global order is increasingly multipolar, with competing powers like the US, China, and Russia. But nations prefer to deal bilaterally, which allows nations to hedge bets, aligning with multiple powers based on specific interests and context.
For India, which is the founding member of the forum and assumes the BRICS chair in 2025, the summit declaration has condemned, in strongest terms, Pahalgam terror attacks, and has also highlighted our concerns on ‘technology weaponisation’ by some countries. BRICS also offers an added diplomatic space for setting global negotiations and also aligns with our desire for non-western perspectives. India for long has championed multilateralism and BRICS offers a significant platform to India’s aspirational role in global politics and its quest for the leadership of the global South. In the year 2015, the forum did play a role for additional IMF quotas while pushing for its reforms, also benefiting China.
India has maintained a cautious approach to BRICS’ financial ambitions. In October 2024, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar emphasised that, “targeting dollar is not our priority.
That’s not part of our economic, political, or strategic policy”. The geopolitical landscape that led India to co-found BRICS three decades ago has shifted now. As India navigates its role in BRICS and its trade talks with the US, it must balance its commitment to multilateralism with its national interests in an increasingly fragmented world.
India must focus on making it a more relevant forum for sustainable infrastructure cooperation, enhancing social security agreements and building larger political understanding against counter terrorism within BRICS countries. While BRICS represents a significant portion of the world’s population and economy, its ability to engineer a “post-American order” remains limited. The ‘Global South’ is an emerging reality, and it’s necessary for BRICS states to interface with this change with political optimism and diplomatic maturity.
(The author is Fellow, BRICS School, Fudan University and is Faculty at Deshbandhu College, University of Delhi)
