Engaging the Taliban amid strategic challenges
By re-entering the high-stakes game of Afghan diplomacy, India is seeking to protect its security and geopolitical interests
Over three years after the Taliban assumed control of Afghanistan, forcing the then President Ashraf Ghani to flee the nation, India is yet to officially recognise the new government. And yet, shedding its misgivings about the new hard-line regime and driven by its strategic concerns, New Delhi has finally decided to step up its engagement with Kabul. In what is a significant policy shift, foreign secretary Vikram Misri met the acting foreign minister of the Afghan government, Amir Khan Muttaqi, in Dubai on January 8.
The two sides chose to meet in a third country because a meeting either in New Delhi or Kabul would not have made for the right optics for India. The Taliban administration has not been recognised by any country so far though several countries, including China, are engaging with it diplomatically, including exchanging ambassadors. While New Delhi had remained in touch with the Taliban leadership with an outreach at the joint secretary level thus far, the Misri-Muttaqi meeting essentially signals India’s willingness to take the bilateral relationship forward. With this upgrade in outreach, India has also indicated it’s back in the high-stakes game of seeking strategic influence in Afghanistan, an important neighbour in the region even if it means engaging with a UN Security Council-sanctioned entity.
A pariah among Western nations, the Taliban finds itself trying to run an internationally isolated country with a beleaguered economy that’s battling crippling economic sanctions. The Taliban’s approach to women – their rights and freedom have been severely curtailed – has contributed to Afghanistan’s isolation. Amid this backdrop, India’s outreach at the foreign secretary level has predictably drawn a positive response from the Taliban leadership.
Not only has it assured New Delhi that it will remain sensitive to India’s security concerns, but also described it as a “significant regional and economic partner”. What has also impelled New Delhi’s diplomatic moves are its security concerns vis-Ã -vis Afghanistan and the instability in the region owing to the geo-political churn in West Asia.
As for Afghanistan, India has had its worries about the Afghan Taliban and its links to Al Qaeda and other terror outfits though, ironically enough, it now finds itself engaging with it formally. Also fuelling Indian anxieties after the Taliban’s takeover was the possibility of its nexus with Pakistan, something a jubilant Islamabad had hoped for in the aftermath of the Islamist group seizing power. Instead, Islamabad-Kabul ties have now nose-dived to a point where the initial bonhomie has given way to heightened tensions and mistrust.
Islamabad has accused the Afghan Taliban of allowing the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) – the two have strong links – to use Afghanistan’s soil to launch attacks against it. Kabul, of course, has denied the charge. Amid the escalating Islamabad-Kabul tensions, New Delhi saw it as an opportune moment to reach out to the Afghan Taliban leadership and build on ties thereon. China’s moves in Afghanistan and its close strategic clinch with Pakistan are yet another reason for New Delhi seeking to return to a more active role in Afghanistan. India’s arch geopolitical rival China took the lead in sending an envoy to Kabul, making it the first country to do so after the Taliban takeover.
The China-Pakistan collusion poses a serious threat to India’s security interests in the region. China has been seeking to increase its footprint in the beleaguered nation long before the Afghan Taliban’s takeover in August 2021. Afghanistan, like many countries in India’s neighbourhood, is a vital element of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Afghan Taliban has voiced support for it. A resource-rich Afghanistan seeking friends during its isolation presents strategic opportunities for China.
In its endeavour to forge close economic and diplomatic links with the Taliban, China has already offered the regime tariff-free access to its energy, construction and consumer sectors. In the Great Game involving Afghanistan, Russia has also been backing Kabul. Moscow, with its complex history with Kabul, has initiated moves to remove the Afghan Taliban from its list of banned terror outfits, while also boosting trade with the country. With all these geopolitical moves centred around Afghanistan in play, India has wisely realised it can no longer afford to remain a mere bystander. A course correction was required to protect its strategic interests, hence the pragmatic decision to engage with the Afghan Taliban. During the Misri-Muttaqi meeting, India indicated its willingness to resume development projects in Afghanistan shortly.
In the past, India had undertaken several large and small development projects in Afghanistan despite the security risks they entailed.
As India takes its first tentative steps to “normalise” ties with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, it will be hoping that the Afghan Taliban will keep to its word of not undermining its security interests. India, of course, will need to tread with caution on the difficult road that lies ahead.
(The writer is a senior journalist who writes on foreign affairs; views are personal)
