Strategic deterrence: The QUAD’s unique role

Given his past decisions—such as withdrawing the US from multilateral agreements like the Paris Climate Accord—Donald Trump may push to reshape the QUAD into a more security-centric framework

As Donald Trump is expected to arrive in New Delhi for the quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) summit this year, there are speculations among many geopolitical analysts that he will push for the militarisation of this structure. They contend that Trump generally doesn’t like to engage in cooperation with other countries in non-security domains, such as HADR missions, climate change, and health, given that he has withdrawn the US from the Paris Climate Accord and other similar initiatives. Assessing the feasibility of such a shift is essential. However, these claims and assertions do not hold, as they contradict the very purpose for which this strategic grouping, the QUAD, was envisaged.

Evolution of the QUAD

The idea of quadrilateral cooperation first emerged after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, when the countries like United States, India, Japan, and Australia  jointly came together to conduct rescue and relief operations, leading to the formation of the “Tsunami Core Group.” In 2007, this cooperation evolved into the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), accompanied by joint military exercises like Exercise Malabar, which that year included the navies of these four QUAD countries and Singapore.

However, China’s strong objections to these developments led to Australia’s withdrawal, causing the QUAD to become inactive. New Delhi did not formally withdraw but maintained a cautious approach due to Chinese pressure. However, the Malabar exercise between India and the US continued and was later joined by Japan as a permanent participant in 2015. The QUAD was revitalised in 2017 in response to China’s increasingly assertive and muscular foreign policy under President Xi Jinping. Since Xi’s rise to power in 2012, China has adopted a more aggressive and assertive stance at the global stage, moving away from its previous policy. This shift has resulted in heightened tensions with neighbouring countries, including ASEAN countries, India, Japan, Australia etc.

For instance, there have been frequent border incursions against India across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) since 2013. In 2014, there was an incursion by the Chinese PLA in the Chumar sector of Ladakh just before Xi Jinping visited India. Additionally, China’s initiation of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) Project, in Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK), which is part of India’s territory, has further strained relations.

China has also opposed India’s membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and has aggressively supported Pakistan in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) by blocking the designation of certain terrorists as global threats. One of the most significant flashpoints between India and China was the Doklam standoff in mid-2017, where Indian and Chinese troops engaged in a 73-day military confrontation near the India-Bhutan-China tri-junction.

Beyond India, China’s actions raised concerns among other QUAD members. Australia faced economic coercion from China, prompting a reassessment of its foreign policy. Moreover, under Xi’s leadership, Japan also came under increasing pressure from China. It has territorial disputes with China over the Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. Furthermore, the United States also became increasingly concerned about China’s expanding influence in the Indo-Pacific, fearing that Beijing was trying to replace it as a preeminent power in the region.  China’s aggression against US allies and partners particularly in the South China Sea, raised concerns for it. The militarisation of the region through the construction of artificial islands, combined with Beijing’s expansive grand global projects like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), made the US nervous and serious about balancing China’s strategic influence.

In light of these developments, the QUAD was revived under President Trump in 2017 as an informal grouping. It was elevated from a secretarial-level dialogue to ministerial-level meetings in 2019. In 2021, the QUAD held its first leaders’ summit and now convenes regularly. It operates as an informal grouping, focusing on both security-related areas-such as the Maritime Domain Awareness Initiative, critical and emerging technologies, cybersecurity, and supply chain resilience-and non-security domains, including humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), health, and climate change, albeit both of these components are strategic.

QUAD countries have deliberately avoided transforming it into a Cold War-era, 20th-century NATO-style binary structure. It must be noted that the core objective of the QUAD is to uphold a “balance of power” and “strategic deterrence” in the Indo-Pacific, rather than to escalate tensions by militarising this framework. Any attempt to weaponise the QUAD would result in insecurity and fuel instability in the region, potentially leading to the opposite of what the QUAD aims to achieve. Such a shift could heighten China’s security dilemma, increasing the risk of direct military confrontation.

Additionally, it could prompt China to adopt counter-escalatory measures, further intensifying geopolitical competition. Ultimately, this would defeat the very purpose of why this framework was created: maintaining a favourable balance of power and strategic deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region.

Furthermore, Trump has consistently opposed security arrangements that require significant long-term commitments. His approach to alliances, as seen during his first term, waslargely transactional.

Moreover, he is sceptical of multilateral security obligations. Given his strong focus on burden sharing, it is unlikely that he would push the QUAD towards a formal military alliance, as doing so would entail huge US security and financial commitments and would contradict his broader policy of cutting down US security burdens.

Militarising the QUAD would also have significant diplomatic repercussions, particularly among ASEAN countries. Most ASEAN countries adopt hedging strategies, balancing their relationships between China and the US cooperating with the US on security matters while remaining economically dependent on China. They seek to maintain strategic flexibility, and militarising the QUAD would limit their manoeuvring space. As a result, they are wary largely of any initiative that appears overtly anti-China. As a result, the QUAD has been structured in such a way as to make it appealing and more acceptable to countries of this region. If it were transformed into a security-centric framework, ASEAN countries would likely distance themselves from it, reducing the QUAD’s broader appeal and effectiveness.

Moreover, the accusations by some that QUAD is merely a talking shop or Asian NATO are inaccurate. It has been actively functioning for a considerable period, with regular engagements at various levels, including leaders’ summits, ministerial meetings, and secretary-level meetings. Additionally, multiple working groups operate across different sectors, reinforcing its collaborative framework. Moreover, recently under Trump, a ministerial-level meeting of the QUAD took place in the US just one day after his inauguration, underscoring the effectiveness and continuity of this strategic grouping even under his second presidency.

Furthermore, QUAD is not an Asian NATO; this is the criticism labelled mostly by China as part of its broader grand strategy to undermine it. This group doesn’t have any such type of administrative structure or binding security commitments like NATO. The QUAD is a different kind of informal, fluid, non-NATO style, and flexible structure based on the realities of the 21st century to maintain a balance of power and strategic deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the QUAD’s strength lies in its flexible, strategic framework, which allows it to address regional challenges without forcing its members into binding security commitments. While security cooperation will remain a key component of its agenda, full-scale militarisation would be counterproductive, undermining both regional stability and the QUAD’s broader strategic goals.

Instead, the QUAD will likely continue on its current trajectory-balancing security and non-security initiatives to maintain strategic equilibrium in the Indo-Pacific.

(The writer is visiting research fellow, International Centre for Peace Studies, New Delhi. Views expressed are personal)