When President Ayub Khan of Pakistan met John F Kennedy at Mount Vernon in July 1961, the atmosphere was far from cordial. The reception, elegantly hosted by First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy, concealed the tension between the two men.
Ayub was irritated over Washington’s decision to extend a generous economic aid package to India, which he viewed as a direct threat to Pakistan’s security. In retaliation, he had suspended the CIA’s covert activities at East Pakistan airbases that supported Tibetan rebels and had even halted U-2 reconnaissance flights monitoring China from West Pakistan. Despite the frosty mood, the evening ended with a compromise. During a private garden walk, Kennedy assured Ayub that the United States would not provide military equipment to India, while Ayub agreed to reopen the airbases for American use.
A few days later, inside the Oval Office, Ayub laid out Pakistan’s case in military terms. Unfurling maps across Kennedy’s desk, he emphasised that India had deployed 85 per cent of its 1.5 million troops against Pakistan, leaving only a fraction on its Chinese frontier. He pointed out Afghanistan’s 80,000-90,000 soldiers, equipped with Soviet arms, positioned along Pakistan’s western border.
Finally, Ayub displayed Pakistan’s defensive lines facing both India and Afghanistan. At the heart of his argument was Kashmir-”Pakistan would be up the gum tree if an attack came from either India or Afghanistan,” he warned. Kennedy and his advisers dismissed Ayub’s predictions of India seeking to “neutralise” Pakistan, but they acknowledged his central claim: Kashmir was a litmus test for peace.
If India resolved the issue, it could transform relations between the two neighbours. Kennedy pressed Ayub for specifics. What compromise could both sides accept? Realistically, Ayub admitted, Nehru would not concede more than the status quo, but Pakistan could not accept this. He suggested Jammu could remain with India, but Pakistan required “some miles” beyond the Chenab River to secure its water resources.
Drawing on the Indus Waters Treaty, Ayub argued that if the western rivers belonged to Pakistan, so too should the adjoining lands. He hinted that Nehru, weakened politically and distant from Kashmiri sentiments, might be more open to a deal than assumed. He added a warning: without progress on Kashmir, American aid to India would achieve little. Kennedy retorted sharply-aid was not to buy India’s friendship, but to safeguard it from communism.
As their discussion wound down, Ayub asked directly: if his efforts to persuade Nehru failed and the matter returned to the UN, would Washington back Pakistan? Kennedy replied with a firm “Yes.” Kennedy’s engagement with Pakistan went beyond geopolitics. Only weeks earlier, the Berlin crisis had nearly pushed the US and USSR into direct conflict, making South Asia’s stability all the more vital. Yet Kennedy also displayed a personal interest in Pakistan’s domestic problems.
The young president, with barely a thousand days in office ahead of him, understood that the post-colonial world was shifting rapidly. The Soviet Union was exploiting this moment through aid, trade, and technical missions, pouring more than $700 million into India by 1960. Kennedy, determined to chart a fresh course from Eisenhower’s policies, sought balance.
While Eisenhower had tilted towards Pakistan with advanced weaponry, Kennedy had advocated more food aid for India during his Senate years. Still, Kennedy recognised the deep fault line of Kashmir. He asked his confidant and ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith, to engage Ayub directly.
Galbraith’s privileged access to the White House unnerved the State Department, but Kennedy trusted his judgment.
Galbraith, despite sympathising with India, admitted its social and economic conservatism, noting how US food aid prevented crises of hunger and projected a sense of progress.
When Galbraith met Ayub in December 1961, the Pakistani leader remained vague on solutions but repeated his central demand: control over Kashmir’s headwaters, especially the Chenab, was vital for Pakistan’s survival. He warned of future Indian diversions that could cripple his country’s economy. For Kennedy, this was a sobering reminder that the Kashmir question was not merely territorial-it was deeply tied to survival, identity, and the region’s fragile peace.
(Excerpts from the book Trial By water: Indus Basin and India-Pakistan Relations, authored by Uttam Kumar Sinha & published by Penguin Random House, 2025)
