JN Dixit, India’s former National Security Adviser and one of the country’s most seasoned diplomats, once wrote that the establishment of relations “with South Africa and then with Israel” was the most significant achievement of his tenure at the Ministry of External Affairs. Few comments capture so neatly the quiet shift in India’s moral compass during the early 1990s. What had once been a foreign policy anchored in solidarity with the Palestinian cause and the Non-Aligned Movement was now tilting towards the emerging strategic triangle of Washington, Tel Aviv, and New Delhi. Three decades later, that tilt has hardened into one of Asia’s most consequential alliances.
The historical roots of the India-Israel connection reach far deeper than the 1992 establishment of formal diplomatic ties. Jewish communities have lived in India for over two millennia. The Cochin Jews of Kerala, who trace their lineage to ancient traders arriving after the destruction of the Second Temple, built some of the oldest synagogues in the Commonwealth and enjoyed relative security unknown to Jews in most of the world. Further east, the Bene Israel settled along the Konkan coast, while smaller Baghdadi Jewish communities flourished in Kolkata and Mumbai. Even in India’s far northeast, the Bnei Menashe of Manipur and Mizoram - who claim descent from one of the Lost Tribes of Israel - have, in recent decades, re-established religious and cultural links with Israel. These intertwined legacies gave both nations a foundation of shared memory long before geopolitics bound them together.
When India formally recognised Israel in 1950 but withheld full diplomatic relations, it was acting within the logic of post-colonial solidarity. Support for Palestinian self-determination was considered integral to India’s moral standing in the developing world. Yet by the early 1990s, that posture had lost its strategic utility. The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union - India’s principal defence supplier - and the global turn towards liberalisation forced New Delhi to rethink. Economic reforms under Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao in 1991 coincided with a shifting global order in which Israel was becoming an indispensable partner for the United States. Establishing relations with Israel thus became not only a matter of diplomacy but also a statement of intent: India was entering the world economy and aligning with its new security architecture.
The years that followed saw a steady deepening of the defence relationship. During the 1999 Kargil conflict with Pakistan, Israel’s rapid supply of surveillance drones and precision-guided munitions filled a critical gap left by other hesitant powers. Israeli firms soon became integral to India’s military modernisation, supplying radar, missiles, and electronic warfare systems. Cooperation later extended into counter-terrorism and intelligence sharing after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, in which Jewish targets were explicitly struck. Israeli expertise in homeland security, border surveillance, and cyber technology found eager clients in India’s expanding security apparatus.
The relationship, however, is not merely about weapons. It is also about ideas — about two nations that see themselves surrounded by threats and justified in adopting extraordinary measures of self-defence. Israel’s militarised ethos and its narrative of technological resilience have appealed to successive Indian governments. For the Hindu nationalist right, Israel represents a model of a small but assertive nation that defends its majority identity against perceived existential enemies. What was once discreet military cooperation has thus evolved into an open political fraternity.
India’s silence on Israel’s controversial actions has grown louder over time. After backing a UN inquiry into Israel’s conduct during the 2014 Gaza war, New Delhi abstained from a similar vote in 2021. By then, “strategic neutrality” had become a convenient cover for convergence. Israel’s defence industry now ranks among India’s top three suppliers, while Indian corporations such as the Adani Group have invested heavily in Israeli infrastructure, including the Haifa Port - a clear symbol of trust.
Last week, the Israel-India Joint Working Group on Defence Cooperation met in Tel Aviv, co-chaired by Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh and Israeli Defence Ministry Director-General Major-General (Res.) Amir Baram. It ended with a Memorandum of Understanding to expand industrial and technological cooperation. Though details were limited, reports indicate India will acquire medium-range surface-to-air missiles worth about $3.75 billion and convert six commercial aircraft into refuelling tankers for nearly $900 million.
In New Delhi, Israel’s Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar called India a “global superpower” and thanked it for promptly condemning the 7 October 2023 Hamas attacks. He noted that Prime Minister Narendra Modi was among the first leaders to call Benjamin Netanyahu - a gesture Israel says it will not forget. The symbolism was clear: both now see themselves as partners in a shared fight against “terror”.
This alignment carries wider implications. The United States, wary of China’s rise and keen to contain Russia, views India as a democratic counterweight in the Indo-Pacific and Israel as its most dependable outpost in West Asia. The emerging “West Asian Quad” (I2U2) — linking India, Israel, the UAE, and the US — embodies a new order where human rights concerns yield to strategic and commercial interests.
Yet contradictions persist. India still depends heavily on Russian arms and energy, and avoids criticising Moscow despite its closeness to Israel and the West. This balancing act underscores New Delhi’s transactional posture but also a shared worldview: both India and Israel see themselves as civilisational states entitled to secure their interests by any means necessary.
What began as cautious diplomacy in 1992 has become a test case for Asia’s future alignments. The partnership is neither pure modernisation nor moral decline but a mirror to a continent where nationalism, technology, and security define power. For Israel, it brings a vast market and a non-Western ally; for India, advanced technology, intelligence, and a partner adept at survival in a turbulent region.
The distance between Tel Aviv and New Delhi has never been shorter - and the space for moral hesitation, once a hallmark of Indian diplomacy, has almost disappeared.
The writer is a Colombo based Columnist; views are personal
