The larger question looms: Can India afford costly engagements with transient outcomes, without a comprehensive reimagining of its military doctrine, defence spending and national security policy?
CDS Gen Anil Chauhan has made the startling comment that costs don’t matter, outcomes do. He was answering questions from Bloomberg in Singapore about the number of Indian jets downed in Op Sindoor. Some previous combat losses: World War II — Allies 91,105 aircraft; Axis Powers 70,900 aircraft. In 1965, IAF 59 aircraft, and Pakistan Air Force (PAF) 43 aircraft in 22 days.
At Balakot both sides incurred the loss of one aircraft each while India also lost a helicopter due to friendly fire, all within 48 hours. There are other examples of air assets lost. But all these engagements were contact wars, some spread over years. Op Sindoor was an 88-hour non-contact, Beyond Visual Range (BVR) conflict.
For India, a developing economy and aspiring to be a developed nation by 2047, the cost of conflict and resultant homeland-instability impinge negatively on development, especially when the outcome is non-decisive and deterrence only transitory. Pakistan will not cease to wage war, skirmishes and proxy wars as it has for the last 80 years.
Delhi failed to terminate wars decisively because of not appreciating the strength of military power and the use of force. Hard power is built over time with costs and investments. The muscular counter-terrorism policy the BJP Government has adopted for over a decade was built on rhetoric, spending less than 2 per cent of GDP on defence. The absence of credible deterrence, erratic use of force and the unresolved issue of Kashmir led to the Pahalgam carnage and other terrorist incidents in Kashmir. Had a more serious view been taken of comprehensive national power, Pakistan would not have dared to bait India periodically. Op Sindoor, its tactical successes and strategic flaws necessitate an immediate defence review encompassing the entire span of the current BJP rule.
Since the appointment of CDS and Department of Military Affairs and the centrality of National Security Adviser and the Defence Planning Committee he leads, strategic thinking ought to have led to the enunciation of defence and security doctrines which in turn could have facilitated the formation of Integrated Theatre Commands, still waiting to happen. The domination of air power will rejuvenate the debate on the indivisibility of air assets and put a spoke in the wheel of the early fruition of Theatre Commands.
First salvos in this regard have already been fired by IAF veterans. No longer is the IAF a support arm as late CDS Gen Bipin Rawat had forcefully averred. After Op Sindoor, it emerged as the sword arm, persuading Army Chief Gen Upendra Dwivedi to skip the CII Military Partnership Summit, Delhi for blessings from the Rajguru of Chitrakoot temple who sought from Army Chief PoK as Guru Dakshina. While Air Chief Marshal AP Singh modestly stole the limelight at the summit following the stand-off campaign of attrition of Pakistan Air Force air and land assets, Gen Dwivedi kept alive the relevance of land forces in the territorial conquest of PoK and in capturing and holding ground.
Returning to reforms, the Government must immediately commit to higher defence spending, which is the manifest trend the world over following the Ukraine war entering its fourth year, the Gaza outrage in its third year, compound instabilities in West Asia and turbulence in the Indo-Pacific, especially the South China Sea. President Trump is telling NATO and Indo-Pacific allies to spend more on defence — 5 per cent for NATO and substantial but unspecified increases for Japan and South Korea. Earlier this month, Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced his Government’s first Strategic Defence Review and an increase from 2 to 2.5 per cent of GDP by 2027 and ultimately, targeting 3 per cent by 2034. He said these are not aspirational but achievable targets. He announced an immediate increase in defence spending of GBP 15 bn, saying additional capabilities will deter conflict, naming Russia (and China) as the main threat.
As India is afraid to name China as a threat, it does not have a written national security policy. Imagine Prime Minister Modi making similar announcements in his Mann ki Baat or an interview with ANI like Starmer did on BBC. He outlined the key ingredients of defence preparedness — the type of equipment the UK would build for its strategic and conventional deterrence and its focus on NATO First. NATO and Europe have three nuclear-armed nations to deter Russia and China.
The other two original nuclear-armed powers all together constitute the P5 in the UN Security Council. India’s defence forces, on the other hand, have been hollowed out over time due to inadequate funding and lethargic procurement procedures. While Aatm-nirbharta is an undeniable great virtue, Delhi’s dependence on Russia, France, the US, Israel, the UK and Germany for niche technologies makes self-reliance somewhat suspect.
Immediate injection of resources, especially in R&D, is imperative if the new normal of enhanced thresholds of non-contact and hot war under the nuclear overhang is to be sustained. Business Standard’s AK Bhattacharya, a long-term advocate of higher defence spending, recently suggested that there were two ways to do this: first, to break the limit on fiscal deficit; and the other to reduce capex to transfer funds to defence.
As this will affect growth, he said, accepting a higher fiscal deficit was the better option. There is a third way too. Past Finance Commissions have tossed ideas but the Government has not shown political courage to make the right choices as those will hurt its welfare schemes and impose a fresh burden on the taxpayer.
Periodic clashes with Pakistan have created uncertainties and instabilities that will deter FDI and discourage shifting supply chains to India. Delhi’s import reliance on China is increasing phenomenally; in 2023–24 to USD 110 bn, which is almost twice India’s defence budget. China remains the primary challenge, rival and competitor. Enhanced defence allocation will have meaning if defence acquisition processes are streamlined to ensure full utilisation of funds by the end of the fiscal. For too long, modernisation funds have had to be surrendered. Costs matter as much as outcomes.
(The writer, a retired Major General, was Commander, IPKF South, Sri Lanka, and a founder member of the Defence Planning Staff, currently the Integrated Defence Staff. Views are personal)
