The coming together of Russia, India and China could be detrimental to US interests and challenge its hegemony like never before
The recently concluded Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit was significant on various counts: It announced China’s emergence as a global leader, signalled the beginning of a multipolar world order, and underlined India’s dilemma of whether to look East or West. Indeed, the Tianjin summit marks a decisive moment in global geopolitics. With the presence of Russia, India, Iran, and newer members such as Belarus, the gathering underscored the bloc’s growing weight as an alternative alignment of nations challenging the traditional Western-led framework. China on its part used the platform to project its role as the torchbearer of multipolarity.
For President Xi Jinping, the gathering was not merely diplomatic theatre but an assertion of China’s ambition to craft a new global order — one where US hegemony is checked by collective cooperation among states weary of Western dominance. With Moscow economically weakened yet politically aligned, Beijing has emerged as the dominant force in geopolitics of the day. The emphasis on trade corridors, rail connectivity, and collective security is a clear extension of Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative, reframed as a multilateral enterprise. For Washington, the summit represents a troubling signal. The SCO now brings together nations ranging from long-standing adversaries like Iran and Belarus to “swing states” such as India, whose participation complicates US attempts to forge cohesive coalitions against China and Russia. The US tariffs, trade uncertainties, and its stand on Gaza and Ukraine have created openings for China to present itself as a more stable economic and political. While the SCO still lacks the institutional muscle like NATO or the EU, its sheer size — covering nearly half the world’s population and vast natural resources — gives it potential weight. Its political narrative is equally significant: That US dominance is neither inevitable nor universally desirable.
For India, the SCO summit highlights both opportunities and dilemmas. New Delhi’s participation gives it a seat at the table in shaping Eurasian security and trade, but it also exposes contradictions in aligning with a bloc dominated by Beijing. Though India’s stand on terrorism has been acknowledged by SCO there is long way to go when it comes to mending fence with China.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s careful statements in Tianjin — emphasising “mutual respect” and “sensitivities”— reflect this balancing act. India cannot afford to blindly follow either camp. Supporting China’s global vision risks undermining its Indo-Pacific partnerships with the US, Japan, and Australia through the Quad. The Tianjin summit showed that the SCO is no longer a marginal bloc but an arena where the battle of global narratives is unfolding. For China, it is a stepping stone towards multipolarity and an alternative to the US-led order whereas India needs more elbow room to assert itself and become equal partner in multipolar verse.
