While Pakistan and Bangladesh wrestle with their fragile relationship under the interim government led by Yunus, the International Tribunal is set to deliver its verdict on Monday, November 17, formally exposing the alleged “sins” of Sheikh Hasina’s rule. Hasina may face the harshest consequences imaginable, and her potential extradition from India threatens to inflame political passions for years, while social tensions are likely to spiral, carrying dangerous regional implications. Yet, amid this chaos, the most alarming development is the meteoric rise of Field Marshal Asim Munir, Pakistan’s second-ever field marshal, who now operates above the law, consolidating power with an audacity that recalls the darkest chapters of Pakistan’s military past. The country appears to be repeating the cycles of power seen under the late Field Marshal Ayub Khan, with the civilian leadership increasingly marginalised as the military consolidates authority. Munir’s ascent is more than symbolic; it is an institutional shift, codified through the 27th Constitutional Amendment, which enshrines military supremacy in Pakistan’s legal architecture while weakening judicial oversight and eroding democratic norms.
Pakistan’s trajectory under Munir bears echoes of historical precedent. As Ayub Khan recounted in his autobiography, military intervention was repeatedly justified as a stabilising force in times of perceived political chaos. Yet, as history demonstrates, Pakistan’s oscillation between military dictatorship and fragile civilian governance has rarely delivered sustainable reform or economic development. The CIA’s declassified analysis of Pakistan in the 1970s warned that “the military, while professionally competent, is inherently prone to internalising ideological and political objectives beyond its remit,” prescient words that resonate alarmingly today under Munir. Whereas past army chiefs, even Musharraf, attempted to balance professional military traditions with political ambition, Munir is pursuing an explicitly ideological agenda, transforming the Pakistani armed forces into a force fighting for Islam as much as for the nation.
This shift is no longer subtle. The Pakistani defence establishment under Munir has institutionalised terms like Fitna al-Khawarij and Fitna al-Hindustan, branding insurgents in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan as heretical or Indian proxies. In Munir’s own words, the military must confront these “internal threats” through a religious lens, positioning Pakistan as the protector of the Muslim Ummah while simultaneously framing domestic conflicts as extensions of historic Islamic struggles. By co-opting centuries-old concepts from early Islamic history, Munir projects an image of Pakistan as a state under siege from both heretical internal actors and a hostile external India. While the rhetorical appeal resonates with sections of the Pakistani populace, it dangerously blurs the line between counter-insurgency and ideological warfare.
The implications of Munir’s rise extend far beyond domestic politics. Pakistan’s foreign policy, historically fixated on India, is increasingly intertwined with efforts to construct regional alliances that challenge New Delhi’s influence. Reports suggest that Islamabad is exploring deeper cooperation with Dhaka under the interim government, ostensibly to counterbalance Indian ambitions. The Financial Times noted that Munir, along with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, has been actively courting powers such as China, Saudi Arabia and even the United States, while simultaneously framing Pakistan’s mineral wealth and strategic ports like Pasni as sites for foreign investment. Yet, beneath this geopolitical manoeuvring lies a darker reality: the potential proliferation of Islamist extremist organisations nurtured under the guise of strategic alignment. Pakistan’s track record demonstrates the inherent danger of weaponising ideology for political leverage, a pattern that has repeatedly generated instability both internally and across the region.
The Pakistani military’s Islamisation under Munir recalls the ambitions of General Zia-ul-Haq, whose coup in 1977 dismantled democratic institutions and laid the foundations for a deeply Islamist state. Analysts such as Makhdoom Ali Khan have remarked: “What General Zia-ul-Haq may have dreamt of, and what General Pervez Musharraf could not achieve, will soon be an accomplished fact.” Munir, a Hafiz-e-Quran, has emphasised the religious legitimacy of military campaigns, framing them as moral and ideological imperatives. The creation of a constitutional backdoor through the 27th Amendment formalises his authority, grants him lifetime protection and the Field Marshal rank, and establishes the Chief of Defence Forces as the paramount military authority, effectively sidelining civilian oversight.
The judiciary, meanwhile, is being systematically curtailed. The Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) assumes constitutional primacy over the Supreme Court, while the Supreme Court is relegated to civil and criminal appellate functions. Senior counsel have observed that the SC is now left “with a limited jurisdiction of deciding ordinary civil, criminal, and statutory appeals”, effectively reducing it to a “Supreme District Court”. Tariq Mehmood Khokhar warned that the FCC is “empowered by disempowering the Supreme Court”, consolidating both military and executive control over constitutional interpretation. Dawn reported that these reforms have been lauded by supporters as a forward-looking model, yet for sceptics, they represent an erosion of checks and balances that has long been the only bulwark against authoritarian overreach.
Meanwhile, Pakistan’s economy remains precarious. According to the Financial Times, despite claims of investment inflows and resource wealth, the country continues to struggle with a poverty rate above 25 per cent, low capital formation, and a foreign investor climate undermined by historical instability.
The military’s deepening involvement in business, combined with ideological militarisation, may further deter meaningful economic reform. Muhammad Aurangzeb, Pakistan’s finance minister, has acknowledged the “existential issue” of growth that barely matches population increase, raising questions about the sustainability of Munir’s ambitious geopolitical and domestic projects. The potential consequences for the region are profound. Islamabad’s portrayal of an Indian-backed insurgency in its western provinces, along with efforts to foster a Bangladesh-Pakistan axis, risks triggering unprecedented crises in South Asia. Munir’s rhetorical framing of conflicts as a defence of Islam may embolden extremist organisations, both domestic and transnational, increasing the likelihood of cross-border terrorism. The May 2025 four-day conflict between India and Pakistan, during which Munir publicly credited the ceasefire to Donald Trump and even nominated him for a Nobel Peace Prize, highlights the unpredictable consequences of a military-led foreign policy driven by ideology rather than strategic calculation.
As reports suggest, Munir’s elevation to Field Marshal and Chief of Defence Forces cements his unassailable position, giving him autonomy over the military and, by extension, significant influence over Pakistan’s foreign relations. Critically, Pakistan is not an exception in the history of militarisation.
From Ayub Khan to Musharraf, every military takeover has promised stability, reform or modernisation, yet invariably delivered repression, economic mismanagement and heightened regional tension. Historical lessons prove that the militarisation of state institutions often generates the opposite of the intended outcomes: weakened governance, erosion of civil society and the proliferation of extremism. The current trajectory under Munir suggests a repeat of these patterns, now intensified by the infusion of ideological rigour and constitutional legitimacy.
However, one cannot disregard that India’s hegemonic ambitions, regional arrogance, and strategic failures further complicate the equation. New Delhi’s insistence on projecting influence over Bangladesh and Nepal, combined with its self-assured posturing vis-à-vis Pakistan, contributes to an environment in which Islamabad is incentivised to consolidate internal authority and project power externally. Yet history demonstrates that attempting to create strategic depth through ideological militarisation or cross-border alliances often backfires. As TS Eliot’s words might suggest, this transformation is not occurring “with a bang but with a whimper”, yet the consequences are likely to reverberate loudly across the subcontinent for decades.
The writer is a columnist based in Colombo; views are personal
