The discourse on bilateral relations in our country is well populated at both extremes — of naïve jingoism of the hawks, on the one hand, and defensiveness of the doves, on the other. What is required is to recover the middle ground in a professional, strategic perspective
This column begins with a brief review of India-China relations promised in last Saturday’s column, in the context of the suggestion made therein that a return to basics in the boundary negotiations was desirable in order to take them (and overall political ties) out of the groove they have gotten into in recent years.
1988 visit
In 1988, India made a huge concession during the so-called path-breaking visit of late PM Rajiv Gandhi — giving in to the Chinese preference for proceeding ahead with “normalisation” pending a border settlement, and insistence that the latter not be allowed to impede the former.
[Prior to this, Indian thinking (whose foundations were laid by late President KR Narayanan, the first Indian Ambassador to China, after 1962, hand-picked by Smt. Indira Gandhi in 1976 to explore possibilities of a dignified reconciliation) was that relations with China could not be “normal” until the border issue was out of the way. PM Vajpayee had, in 1979, not yielded to Deng Xiaoping’s plea to leave the boundary question to future generations. “Kal kare so aaj kar, aaj kare so ab,” he had countered in his inimitable witty manner.]
What did it get in returnIJ A promise of a border settlement at the most perhaps but, concretely, only a Joint Working Group to discuss the issue that was discarded after five years of infructuous talks in favour of the “Special Representatives (SR)” mechanism on the plea that the matter required a political approach (to think away from set bureaucratic patterns). But the latter has not delivered either, even after 17 rounds. Yet the Chinese have managed to secure reiteration of the 1988 formulation (concession) from the Indian side in every single political document signed by the two countries since then, in successively stronger language — heralding a series of unilateral concessions by India.
The quid pro quo question is missing in the discourse on China in the country, sadly. As also whether the SR mechanism can be said to have lived up to its raison d’ etre or has it turned out to be a case of old wine in new bottles IJ Hopefully, these questions will be asked internally in the BJP Government’s review of the state of play before despatching the newly appointed SR to Beijing for talks.
2005 Strategic Partnership
The same happened with the 2005 decision to go in for a “strategic partnership” with China. The Chinese would, understandably, have been keen for it (to underplay their strategic isolation in their neighbourhood and globally), but what was the compulsion for India to concede it in advance of a border settlement — with Sino-Pak relations being what they were (and still are)IJ And ahead of Japan (which had to make do, in that same month — April 2005 — with no more than a “strategic orientation” to its “Global Partnership” with India established much earlier, in 2000, and wait another year and a half, till December 2006, before it could secure a full-fledged “Strategic and Global Partnership” with India). Could the description “constructive and cooperative partnership”, already agreed to just two years earlier during the visit of PM Vajpayee, not have done as wellIJ What did India secure in return for such a major “give”, as in 1988IJ
This question too can only be addressed internally, within Government, and must be done in a spirit of introspection, in the interest of better decision-making in the politico-strategic realm.
2005 Agreement
Part of the answer to this second question, about the rationale of the 2005 Strategic Partnership with China, would be said to lie in the “Agreement on Political Parameters & Guiding Principles for Settlement of the Boundary Question” concluded alongside. That Agreement was widely hailed at that time (including by seasoned China experts, not just laymen) as a breakthrough. This was mainly because of Article VII of the Agreement, which provided that the boundary “should be along well defined and easily identifiable natural geographical features” and that both countries would “safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas” while reaching a “boundary settlement” — a formulation that was naively projected as presaging Chinese readiness to finally drop their claims in the Eastern sector (i.e. Arunachal Pradesh) as part of a package deal involving Indian concessions in the Western sector (i.e. Aksai Chin).
However, the very next year China put paid to all such expectations, with its Ambassador in New Delhi publicly (re)asserting claim to the whole of Arunachal Pradesh on the eve of his President’s visit to India. Moreover, the Chinese let it be known that any interpretation of Article VII envisaging concessions from the Chinese side would not be realistic. There was no change in any circumstance to warrant this back tracking except, of course, the conclusion of the India-US Civil Nuclear Cooperation meanwhile. So what does that say about China’s professions of friendship — that India cannot, in the Chinese scheme of things, even conclude an agreement with the USA having no bearing on China, directly or indirectly without retribution (while China can proceed merrily with its obvious anti-India edge strategic cooperation with Pakistan and pass it off as unexceptionable)IJ
In keeping with that expectation, the 2005 Joint Statement had promised, moreover — nay committed — to pursue “early settlement of the boundary question” as a “strategic objective”. It is a feat of Chinese diplomacy that it managed to do just the opposite in less than a year and a half, without raising eyebrows about the country’s standing as a “strategic partner” of India in the Indian discourse!
Granting, for the sake of argument, that the strategic partnership decision might have been a quid pro quo for the big advance on the border that Article VII might have been felt to be at that time, it still does not measure up to the basic touchstone of diplomacy — of strict reciprocity. Giving away something so obviously weighty as “strategic partnership status” upfront in return for what was evidently no more than a prospect can hardly be considered to be astute, even leaving aside the question of lack of foresight in anticipating possible back-tracking on that promise.
Avoiding abstract formulations subject to varying interpretations, and finding ways of countering crude Chinese attempts at power play, is thus another aspect that needs to be factored into the approach of the Indian side, as the newly appointed SR reviews his inheritance in preparation for embarking on his mission.
In fact, the entire approach of the SR mechanism — the paraphernalia of the “three-stage road map” (proceeding ‘top-down’ from abstract principles and parameters to specifics of territorial adjustments) — is questionable. Why not reverse it to a “bottom-up” one, i.e. beginning with a prior understanding on the specifics of the eventual boundary alignment instead, and come to grips with the nitty-gritty of a settlement now finallyIJ That would be a truly “political” approach, entailing “negotiations” and not just “talks”.
Resetting politico-strategic ties
Overall, the Chinese have got to (be made to) understand that the Indian side is no longer ready to soft pedal the boundary issue in return for promises of a satisfactory settlement in the future — as has been happening, it has to be said, so far.
A final key point is that though the main reason for the “trust deficit” between the two countries is the abortive search for a border settlement that has turned into the wild goose chase for India over the four decades or so since “normalisation” of relations — thrice the duration for which they interacted prior to the 1962 conflict. It is not the only one. China’s machinations in and with Pakistan, anything but benign, are another and this is something that also needs working upon in earnest right away. China must (be made to) effect a qualitative change in the nature of its links with Pakistan, if it wishes its professions of good intent vis-à-vis India, liberally strewn in a host of bilateral agreements (the “Strategic and Cooperative Partnership” above all), to be taken seriously and not scoffed at.
There is a strong case, in sum, for India to press the “reset” button in respect of India-China (politico-strategic) ties. And make (overcoming) the “distrust divide” the driver of India’s interaction with China henceforth. With a view to successfully persuading that country, anxious to court India’s “partnership” globally (reflected in its anxiety to project Sino-Indian relations to have a “global and strategic character” transcending bilateral significance), such diplomatic cleverness is likely to come a cropper unless it shows readiness to walks the talk and mitigate mistrust.
The “resetting” of political ties suggestion is bound to invite questions about realism and feasibility, and doubts about its desirability, in the power equation between the two countries, widely but not very correctly presumed to be totally adverse to India. This column is of the view that the weight of hard, objective, parameters in the India-China politico-strategic equation is relatively less compared to that of soft and subjective factors such as political will and national determination. The gaps in the relationship calling for a reset are all at the Chinese end and, moreover, of a nature that stem not from any objective assessment of national power but defensiveness in diplomacy. It, therefore, believes that India is well placed to pursue a paradigmatic shift in its politico-strategic ties with China. And to not hesitate to convey to that country that the relationship could change to quite the opposite of a strategic partnership if it cannot respond adequately to these (eminently reasonable) concerns underlined at the highest level. With all that such a shift would entail on the external front, regionally and globally, for India’s strategic orientation and Indian foreign policy. And, needless to say, itself be prepared, at the same time, for whatever it takes (including some heat naturally) in the event of major re-alignments becoming necessary — without over-estimating its diplomatic standing and potential internationally but without under-estimating that either.
The discourse on India-China relations in the country is well populated at both extremes — of naïve jingoism of the hawks (seeking deliverance in immediate and visible “retaliatory” action, including militarily, without regard for the morrow), on the one hand, and defensiveness of the doves, on the other, that is responsible for the near complete absence of questioning, even ex-post facto, of obvious omissions and overlooks staring the nation in the face (such as the 1988 and 2005 let downs or acquiescence in the Chinese chutzpah of maintaining the Sino-Pak relationship to be an unexceptionable one, without making it an issue in the India-China relationship). This piece seeks to recover the middle ground in a professional, strategic perspective.
(The writer is a former Ambassador with a background on China, nuclear and other strategic issues. His perspective on India-China Relations can be seen in more detail in his writings at http://www.nias.res.in/aboutnias-people-faculty-ambassadorsaurabhkumar.php )
