Does military influence deter the maturing of political institutions or propel the country to take steps that politicians refuse toij A look back into history...
Being an Army chief in Pakistan has always meant being more than just a senior General in charge of a military. Almost 33 years out of Pakistan’s 71 have been superintended by military rule. In an essay titled The left Review, social scientist Hamza Alavi revealed how, at the time of its creation, the only established state institution Pakistan inherited was the Army. Alavi explained that in August 1947, Pakistan lacked economic resources and political institutions, but inherited an established military from British colonialists. Pakistan struggled to develop civilian political institutions; its military was the only organised state entity to resolve issues triggered by political conflicts between ‘underdeveloped civilian bodies’. Therefore, almost every Pakistani military chief has brought something more to the table than what was expected. Pakistan’s first military chief was a high-ranking British Army man, Gen Frank Messervy, who made his presence felt almost immediately. HV Hodson, in his 1969 book, The Great Divide, writes that when then Governor of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), George Cunningham, informed Messervy that the Chief Minister of the NWFP, Abdul Qayyum Khan, was preparing tribal Pakhtun men for a clandestine invasion of India-held Kashmir, Messervy approached Jinnah and asked him to restrain Qayyum Khan.
Messervy retired in February 1948 and was replaced by another British military man, Gen Douglas Gracey. Though picked by Jinnah, historians believe that like Messervy, he, too, deterred Jinnah from sending troops inside Kashmir. However, Maj Gen Wajahat Hussain, in his book, Memories of a Soldier: 1947, Before, During, After, writes that this was a latter-day concoction that did much to organise Pakistan’s regular troops on the Kashmir border. The ‘misperception’ may have been proliferated by Maj Gen Akbar Khan. Hussain writes that Akbar and Gracey were at loggerheads. In his 1975 biography, Raiders in Kashmir, Akbar comes across as someone who wasn’t happy about the manner in which Gracey conducted the Kashmir operation. Akbar was arrested in early 1951 for planning a coup against liaquat Ali Khan’s Government. According to Hasan Zaheer’s book, The Rawalpindi Conspiracy 1951, the Times and Trial of: The First Coup Attempt in Pakistan, Akbar, along with 11 military officers and four members of the communist party of Pakistan, were hauled up and charged for planning to overthrow the Government. Gracey eased in January 1951 and replaced by Ayub Khan. He was active in ‘advising’ many Prime Ministers who came and went till 1958. In late 1958, Ayub Khan installed the country’s first military rule through a coup. The causes of the coup, Ayub claimed, were growing corruption, political instability and “the peddling of Islam for political gains by the politicians”.
Ayub Khan proclaimed himself Field Marshal and got himself ‘elected’ as President. He made Gen Muhammad Musa the new military chief. Ayub’s ‘modernist’ regime was largely popular until Pakistan went to war with India in 1965. Gen Musa remained loyal to the Government. In September 1966, Musa retired and was replaced by Gen Yahya Khan as Army chief. As the effects of the war began to impact the economy, Ayub’s regime faced rising opposition. In March 1969, Yahya nudged Ayub to resign. Yahya Khan, a colourful character, then became President. Though today he is remembered as the general under whose command the country lost its eastern wing (East Pakistan) in December 1971, it was during his rule that Pakistan held its very first election based on adult franchise. But due to the East Pakistan debacle, a group of military officers forced Yahya to resign and hand over power to ZA Bhutto, whose party had won the second-largest number of seats in the 1970 election. Bhutto appointed lt Gen Gul Hassan as the new Army chief. Hassan was one of the officers who asked Yahya to resign.
However, in March 1972, Bhutto dismissed Hassan. He was replaced by Gen Tikka Khan as Army chief. The military’s influence on the country’s politics was at its lowest during the Bhutto years. In March 1976, Bhutto surprised political pundits by making Zia Ul Haq the new military chief. A year later, in July 1977, Zia toppled the Bhutto Government. The move was welcomed by most opposition parties, which had accused the regime of rigging the 1977 election. Zia remained military chief through self-extensions for 11 years, as he oversaw Pakistan turn into a belligerent state ruled in the name of Islam. The military’s political role enhanced during his tenure. In August 1988, Zia was killed in a plane crash and Gen Mirza Aslam Beg became the new military chief. Even though civilian rule returned, the military’s influence on politics continued. The military’s political influence soared during the Musharraf regime (1999-2008), while he remained military chief through self-extensions. Even when civilian rule returned in 2008, the Army’s influence loomed large across the next three chiefs: Gen Kayani (2007-2013), Gen Raheel Sharif (2013-2016) and Gen Bajwa (2016 to date). According to observers, the post-1980s political influence of the military is mostly because the institution sees itself as the only cohesive and stable institution in a country with deep sectarian, sub-sectarian and political fissures. Though one section of the intelligentsia blamed such influence to be detrimental to the maturing of the country’s political institutions, other section suggests that the military is capable of doing what politicians refuse to do. The most recent example they give is of Gen Raheel and how he initiated the much-delayed military operation against extremists in 2015. Those holding this view say that, had it been left to the politicians, ‘Pakistan would have been turned into another Syria or Yemen.’
(Courtesy: The Dawn)
