While most political regimes have historically maintained standing armies, it was not uncommon for them to rely on paramilitary units such as mercenaries. The allure of the mercenary nestled primarily in the fact that there was no need to train them and their loyalty could, quite literally, be bought by the highest bidder. While soldiers of fortune supplemented the army, they still functioned by and large under the orders of the state authority in charge of warfare. In modern times, while mercenaries still exist, some states have opted to unfortunately and unwisely rely on terrorists to fulfil their political agenda. Governments rely on terror outfits mainly due to the convenience of deniability and the ability of said outfits to function outside the confines of the rules of war and classical administration.
While traditional terrorism is in itself quite a significant challenge to any state’s machinery, state sponsored terrorism is even more complex and resilient. Terrorists and revolutionaries are almost indistinguishable and arguably even identical. However, where terrorism aims to coerce innocents, a revolution might solely be directed against the state and state agencies with the aim of bringing radical transformative change in the existing socio-political order. For instance, communism, at least ideologically, relies on revolution to bring about transformation. Consequently, when a state begins to provide impetus to terrorist militant outfits, the outcome is dangerously unpredictable and volatile. A most simple investigation into the history of the Taliban would illustrate why a state sponsored terrorist organisation is a double edged sword that is absolutely indiscriminate and wanton in its functioning.
However, the tale of the Taliban would be incomplete without delving into the roles of the other players, namely Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States of America along with a few relevant others. Originally, Afghanistan was a land dominated by different tribal and ethnic groups as the region had undergone multiple conquests and had been a part of several dynasties. Most modern monarchs of Afghanistan had to deal with the errant tribes mostly because they actively chose to interfere in the way of life of the tribals. Eventually, in 1978, the monarchy was replaced by a republican set up under the Marxist-Leninist PDPA, led most notably by Babrak Karmal. The PDPA, People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan brought in radical reforms, most importantly giving women the right to vote and equality in education. The reforms were incendiary and an impudent challenge in the eyes of the conservatives. Furthermore, the PDPA was actively and passionately supported by the Soviet Union, which saw Afghanistan as a suitable candidate to add to its roster of allies to help deal with the rigours of the cold war. The secular nature of the PDPA and the U.S.S.R. eventually led to violent rebellion by the Mujahideen. The Soviet Union had to deploy troops in the region as a countermeasure to quell the Mujahideen rebellion. The Mujahideen essentially pictured themselves as crusaders, embarked on a holy war to preserve their religion from the infidels.
It is worth noting that the western paranoia surrounding communism and the Cold War, led the western bloc to undertake some incredibly risky steps. The U.S.A. through the C.I.A., the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia transferred vast sums of money and resources to the rebel Mujahideen in the hopes that they would oust the Soviet influenced regime in Afghanistan. Even earlier, the British viewed Pakistan as a buffer state to stem the march of communism and protect India from being seduced by the guiles of the Soviets. In turn Pakistan viewed Afghanistan as a buffer state with respect to India and desired that Afghanistan return to its traditional islamic way of functioning. The Arab Gulf States perceived the secularism of the erstwhile Afghanistan government as a threat to Islam. The ensuing, decade long Soviet-Afghan War, which lasted from 1979 to 1989 was in essence a proxy war being fought to protect the vested interests of third party states; all at the expense of the Afghans.
Eventually, the Mujahideen, backed by the U.S.A., Pakistan, U.K. and the Arab Gulf States succeeded in causing the Soviets to withdraw in 1989, thus bringing the Soviet-Afghan war to a close. The Geneva Accords, 1988, signed between Afghanistan and Pakistan were predicated on the principles of non-interference, which Pakistan failed to abide by in the following years. The Mujahideen were not invited to be part of the accords and therefore, they refused to recognise the agreements. Following the exit of the Soviets, the power dynamic shifted drastically in favour of the Mujahideen who stormed Kabul in 1992 and toppled Najibullah’s government. The new socio political environment of Afghanistan was characterised by deep instability, chaos, economic and philosophical decline, rampant drug trade and terrorism. By this time the Mujahideen had gained considerable territorial dominance and refused to be pawns of the I.S.I and Pakistan.
Subsequently, in 1994 the nation saw the first appearance of a powerful Taliban on the political stage. Initially founded by students, its ideology was premised in traditional islamism and a large number of its members, including leaders, were originally trained mujahideen, who had participated in the civil war. While the government of Pakistan categorically denies it, the I.S.I. was instrumental in founding and funding the Taliban since it hoped to install a political leadership in Afghanistan that was favourable to the aims of Pakistan. The Mujahideen, initially and then the Taliban were viewed by the Pakistanis as an extremely efficient force to further their own agenda. What made the Mujahideen and their successors, the Taliban, so effective was the perfect trifecta of a trained force, funding and readily available arms and ammunition. There was no need for Pakistan to deploy its own resources or even waste time in building a trained militia. While Pakistan has routinely denied it, the Taliban has continued to augment the formal Army of Pakistan in the contested areas of Kashmir.
However, while the Mujahideen and Taliban proved to be handy in the short-run, their volatility came back to haunt even their allies. The terrorists have proved to be as much of issue to Pakistan as to the rest of the world. The T.T.P., Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, has long proved to be a thorn in Pakistan’s side. The Pakistani Taliban, stormed and killed 132 students, including children, in an Army Public School in Peshawar. The bureaucrats of the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa have to pay regular tributes to the terrorists in the region even though the region is an official province of Pakistan. Goods traveling from Pakistan to Afghanistan are required to pay an informal and patently illegal duty to the Taliban to ensure safe passage, while no such duty is imposed upon goods travelling in the opposite direction. The terrorists have even been so brazen as to launch an attack a mere 15 miles from a covert nuclear weapons storage facility near Masroor. Several Pakistani Army rangers and commandos were required in subduing the terrorists following an 18 hour siege of the naval aviation base at PNS Mehran. Even the Al-Qaeda and Taliban had formed a brotherhood of sorts over the years, which had severely compounded the issue into one, which plagued the world for years on end and still continues to do so; arguably to a lesser degree.
It goes to show that unregulated militant outfits are never far from devolving into outright terror organisations and such organisations are never ones to shy away from biting the very hand that once fed them.
The writer is a Lawyer by profession. Views expressed are personal.
