Governments love the theatre of reform. New logos, glossy launches, ribbon-cutting ceremonies — ministers photographed signing memos as if history has just been rewritten. But spectacle and substance are not the same. I call this pattern the isometric heuristic: transformations that preserve the shape of power while creating the appearance of change.
The term comes from geometry — “isometric” means equal measure. In public policy, it’s the tendency of systems to rebrand, rename or reshuffle while keeping underlying incentives and structures untouched. From the outside, things look different; inside, the machinery hums exactly as before.
This isn’t just a catchy phrase. Scholars have long examined related phenomena. “Institutional isomorphism” describes how organisations mimic one another without improving performance. “Isomorphic mimicry” captures the way developing countries copy the institutional forms of richer nations without adopting their functions. “Symbolic politics” refers to policy moves that exist largely for appearances. The isometric heuristic is different. It is not always conscious mimicry. It is the system’s built-in survival reflex — changing just enough to look different, not enough to alter the underlying equilibrium.
The pattern repeats In a predictable five-step cycle. First comes a crisis or a pressure point — falling outcomes, public anger, or a global embarrassment. Second, the system responds theatrically: the launch of a “new” scheme, commission, or policy. Third, structural avoidance sets in — real power, budget flows and accountability chains remain intact. Fourth, there is a short-term uptick in public confidence, donor support or media coverage. And fifth, the numbers slide back, cynicism grows, and the next crisis sets the stage for the cycle to begin again.
History is full of such examples. When the USSR faced stagnation in the late Soviet period, it announced sweeping modernisation drives but left central planning untouched. In India, education reforms have often come with new names and curricula while teacher accountability systems and funding patterns stayed the same. The appearance of motion masked the absence of real progress.
The Isometric heuristic is a ubiquitous psycho – administrative phenomenon. It is not the monopoly of any country or ideology . It is a reflex found in democracies, single-party states, and everything in between. In India, rural sanitation coverage officially leapt from 39 per cent to nearly 98 per cent between 2014 and 2019, yet independent surveys (NFHS-5) still found one in four households practising open defecation — proof that infrastructure announcements had raced ahead of behavioural and institutional change. In China, decades of “state-owned enterprise reform” have produced modern corporate façades — share listings, boards, glossy reports — while the Party’s control and incentive structures remain largely intact, and profitability gains often flow from state preference rather than true competition.
The United States offers two powerful illustrations. The War on Drugs has been repackaged for half a century — “Zero Tolerance,” “Just Say No,” “Smart on Crime” — yet enforcement still targets low-level possession, incarceration remains high, and racial disparities persist. The Affordable Care Act promised a structural leap toward universal healthcare, but preserved the private-insurance core, leaving costs high and access gaps unresolved. Whether in sanitation, corporate governance, criminal justice, or health reform, the pattern recurs: the look changes, the system stays.
Why does this happen? Three forces reinforce the isometric heuristic. The first is cognitive comfort — deep change is threatening, so cosmetic tweaks feel safer. The second is organisational incentives — bureaucrats and political actors are rewarded for announcements and visible launches, not for outcomes years later. The third is political constraint — genuine reform often threatens entrenched interests whose backlash can destabilise power. In short, incentives reward motion, not progress.
Breaking this reflex requires policy design that forces structural shifts. Sunset clauses, for instance, can ensure that every major policy expires unless re-approved after a rigorous impact review. This carries the risk of losing good programmes, which can be mitigated by re-approving those that demonstrably work.
Outcome-based budgeting can link funding to measurable results rather than to the number of activities undertaken. The danger here is gaming of metrics, which calls for independent audits and random verification. Another strategy is “asymmetry design” — shifting real decision rights to new actors, not just changing titles or boards. While this can trigger turf wars, phased transitions with aligned incentives can smooth the process. And transparency triggers — automatic public release of performance data — can keep pressure on systems to maintain results, though data must be presented with context to avoid misinterpretation.
If the isometric heuristic is real, it should be possible to detect it in the numbers. In most major policy overhauls, more than half of announcements will involve rebranding or renaming; less than a fifth of budgets will actually shift in real terms; and outcome indicators will show a brief improvement followed by a plateau. Governments that disagree should publish the data — not just spending figures, but staffing patterns, decision-rights maps, and long-term outcome trends.
Why does this matter? Because cosmetic change is worse than no change. It burns political capital, breeds public cynicism, and leaves systems brittle for the next crisis. In an era of climate shocks, geopolitical risk, and technological churn, pretending to change is a luxury we can no longer afford. The isometric heuristic can be overcome, but only when leaders are rewarded for outcomes, not optics. That demands political courage: breaking structures that no longer serve, even at short-term cost.
The next time we see a ribbon cut or a policy renamed, it must be decided : is this a rebuild, or just a repaint? The answer may decide whether we emerge from our next crisis stronger — or simply ready for the next performance.
Devanshu Jha is a public policy expert and thought leader .He is an alumnus of London School of Economics, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy and IIM RANCHI.
