The US is likely to favour the rule of ‘establishment’ or through its proxies in Pakistan rather than maverick politician Imran Khan
Grandfather of realpolitik and the man who defined the US art of foreign diplomacy, Henry Kissinger, said about the Iran-Iraq war, “It's a pity both sides can't lose”. Despite official stands of political correctness, the US had supported both sides in the bloody conflict that left over a million dead. The US had provided money and support to the Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, and overlooked his excesses like the Halabja massacre where Saddam had used genocidal chemical weapons, and also declared the defeat of Iran as its foreign policy goal. A few years later, murky details of the White House secretly selling weapons to Iran emerged (violating its own declared embargo) to raise funds for anti-communist guerrillas in Nicaragua (Iran-Contra scandal). The reality of America’s stated preference towards Iraq to counter the rabid anti-Americanism of Shiite Iranian Ayatollahs, and in parallel secretly raising funds by selling arms to Iran, was a heady admixture of posturing, commerce, amorality, and convenience – about which Kissinger also said, “America has no permanent friends or enemies, only interests”.
Another realm that personifies the US’s ‘interests’ driven foreign policy approach is Pakistan. The seeds of the US-Pakistan relationship were planted by Pakistan’s first military ‘strongman’ and later President, Ayub Khan, who dialled up the fears of ‘communists’ within, and asserted that the Pakistani Army or ‘establishment’ was the only institution capable of controlling the situation.
The moral culpability of the United States (especially of the Nixon-Kissinger duo) in tellingly looking the other way when Pakistan was perpetrating genocide against its own Bengalis – only because Islamabad was facilitating American ‘interests’ of critical engagement with China, is well documented. American intrigues and machinations in framing its equation with Pakistan according to the principle of ‘interests’, were again reignited with Operation Cyclone (code name for covert US CIA program to support mujahideen in Afghanistan). For all its purported global championing of democracy and liberality, the Americans were comfortably engaging with yet another Pakistani Military dictator i.e., General Zia-ul-Haq (who had dismissed a democratically elected government and hung its former Prime Minister i.e., Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto) and were arming the zealot-like mujahideen. This counter-intuitive US-Pakistan bonhomie and accommodation of the Pakistani Generals was explained by larger American ‘interests’ that had got complicated with Russians in Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution – both in 1979. Beyond a point, Americans didn’t care about niceties like democracy, freedoms etc., as their own ‘interests’ warranted downplaying platitudes about democracy in Pakistan and clearly the still relatively secular and Westernized ‘establishment’ was a better bet than the unhinged, reckless, and untrustworthy civilian politicians.
Later too, the Americans gave a long rope to Military dictators like Pervez Musharaff when he deposed the Nawaz Sharif government.
Today, when Pakistan is drawn into an intense power struggle between the Military ‘establishment’ and an ostensibly popular-democratic force in Imran Khan, the situation is precarious and can swing either way. The choice is not symmetric or linear as Imran Khan had been ranting and railing against the United States till recently, whereas the ‘establishment’ had been on the mute button – should Washington DC tilt in favour of the ‘establishment’ or democratic forces? Yet again, Kissinger’s transactional and cold-blooded principle of ‘interests’ will determine the way forward and not some vacuous clichés of morality.
There are many considerations like the discredited civilian dispensation in power, the neighbourhood of anti-Americanism in Kabul and Tehran, China’s footprint in Pakistan, imploding Pakistan with its unbridled religiosity, economic devastation and societal dissonance. Evaluating the ability of the ‘establishment’ vis-à-vis Imran Khan to be able to control the situation and disallow the narrative of anti-Americanism to spread any further from what it already has, will be key. Imran realises the limitations and contradictions of ‘Communist’ China supporting ‘Islamic’ Pakistan beyond its own needs and ‘interests’, as also the unavailability of snapping ties with Washington DC. Therefore, Imran has lowered his grandstanding against the Americans (post the unsubstantiated ‘threat letter’). But has Imran done enough to convince the Americans of his trustworthiness, balance, and measure?
Americans too are facing economic stress and over-stretch of their military/commercial resources, and their appetite to risk relations with the temperamental ‘Taliban Khan’ (Imran) would be extremely limited. For all their misadventures, entitlements, and undemocratic moorings the option (and experiences with Ayub, Zia, and Pervez) of the ‘establishment’ seems more reliable, stable, and future-aligned. Prospects of nuclear safety are also surer in the hands of the ‘establishment’ as opposed to an Imran who could put the same as a bargaining lever in any tricky situation. Whether the US would allow a direct rule of ‘establishment’ or through its proxies like the existing coalition is a fixable issue. US nudge towards the ‘establishment’ seems more plausible and that could tilt the scales in favour of the Generals.
(The writer, a military veteran, is a former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Puducherry. The views expressed are personal)
