India will always be subjected to pinpricks at will by China. Is this the way we want to tame the dragon and let it become a threat from a challenge? The answer obviously is ‘no’
The stand-off at Doklam in 2017 has been followed by another and bigger face-off in Eastern Ladakh now, with defence analysts, diplomats and strategic experts predicting the frequency to be almost annual due to the ostensible Chinese annoyance at the rapid rate of development of infrastructure along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) by India which neutralises the asymmetry created by the former till now. While on one hand China was actively trying to build a new image of a responsible global power by its increasing participation in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) like peacekeeping, anti-piracy and humanitarian assistance, on the other it has not shed its belligerent attitude on the border with India due to the potential threat it perceives from India in its quest to become a superpower. It continues to encircle India through its “Strings of Pearl” and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) doctrine. Despite the desire expressed by Xi Jinping in his early years of presidency to speedily resolve the border dispute with India, China appears to be in no hurry to resolve the boundary dispute and on the contrary is becoming increasingly aggressive to reach areas as claimed by it and marked in our maps as “Claim Line.”
China’s national goal is to achieve unification and build a moderately prosperous society by 2050, which would coincide with the centenary year of Communist rule. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has directed its army, the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) to ensure that no internal or external forces should be able to sabotage China’s economic engine or embarrass its national honour. The current stand-off is a result of this mandate to the PLA because it feels threatened in Aksai Chin, a safe bet for the PLA till now. Both Aksai Chin and Karakoram Pass are China’s jugular veins.
In response to the offer of US President Trump for a mediation to resolve the stand-off which as per the US assessment is “very serious”, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh has informed his US counterpart that, “It has been India’s efforts to ensure that the tension does not escalate. It should be resolved through talks at the military and diplomatic levels. We have already developed a mechanism for the same. Negotiations are ongoing between the two countries at the military and diplomatic level.”
Going by the statements of the spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry and the Chinese Ambassador to India, Beijing, too, wants to resolve the issue mutually. China, before ordering the standoff, would have war-gamed the Indian responses and worked out an exit strategy to match each Indian response. New Delhi’s response, though firm and clear, has been traditional and nothing “out of the box.” Hence, as in the past, if China is keen to resolve the issue, it would buy time, coerce India through psychological operations, deception and threat of a conflict to seek a withdrawal on its terms. But India this time is adamant not to succumb to any type of pressure keeping in mind the prevailing geopolitical environment loaded heavily in its favour. In that case, China may agree to find a face-saving settlement for the time being but the dragon is known for its vengeance and non-forgiving behaviour.
The threat from the dragon may only be deferred for the next campaigning season but not eliminated. Can the present stand-off be China’s revenge for Doklam with a new recalibrated response and so on? Status quo, therefore, is advantage China.
In the mind of our security policymakers China is not a threat but a challenge. The threat/challenge posed by an adversary is assessed by the policymakers based on their capabilities and intent. The major difference lies in assessing the intent of the adversary. If an adversary has hostile intentions as well as a matching military capability to pursue those intentions it is categorised as a “threat.” In the assessment of our policymakers, though China possesses a strong military capability, it does not harbour “hostile” intentions, hence categorised as a “challenge.” Rightly so, because of the stated national goal as mentioned above. But it does not take time for a militarily strong nation to change its intentions, particularly when the country is known for expansionist and extra-territorial ambitions.
Such a policy is good to justify the ongoing debate of “Gun versus Butter” in a developing economy and a nation burdened with a yawning gap between the rich and the poor. Fortunately India falls quite low in China’s current threat assessment and “worst-case scenarios.” But can India remain happy with status quo or must it plan alternatives to meet growing Chinese aggressiveness and assertiveness?
“India can end Chinese transgression if the conflict is taken to Beijing’s worry spot(s),” says Ram Madhav, National General Secretary of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Besieged by a geopolitical situation, which led to a global assault against it, the dragon has decided to be proactive rather than succumb to the global pressure led by the US. It decided to convey a subtle message to the US’ potential allies through posturing and aggression in what is referred to as “signalling” in strategic terminology. In doing so, it made the cardinal mistake of opening up too many fronts simultaneously. The South China Sea (SCS), Taiwan, Hong Kong and the Sino-Indian border. Even Australia, a friend of China, joined the global onslaught against it. Japan was also becoming aggressive. China felt that it had been cornered and its move against India may prove costly.
China knows that in the current stand-off, militarily, both the Chinese and the Indian Army are equally strong, with India enjoying shorter lines of communication as compared to China. In case of a conflict, India would be at an advantage and will be able to concentrate more forces than China could deploy. No doubt China would bank on collusion with the Pakistan Army to tie down Indian troops, but even then, it could at best lead to a stalemate. A stalemate would definitely hit China’s image globally and in other areas of conflict and would be a definite loss of face. China has the knack of springing surprises. Beijing may well begin with a non- contact battle; Information Warfare (IW), Electronic Warfare (EW), cyber-attacks, precision munitions followed by a surgical strike. Will we be able to match the Chinese capabilities in the conflict zone? In the end, if China does not vacate Indian territory, New Delhi should have other options to exercise. In such a scenario, India should have the option to signal the Chinese obliquely (through media, strategic community, diplomatic means and so on) that the conflict may not remain localised in the trans-Himalayan region but may spread to the high seas.
If the Indian policymakers consider Indo-Pacific as a soft underbelly of China, have they done enough to encash this advantage through capacity and capability build-up? The zone of peace and tranquility along the LAC espoused between the two nations in the beginning of this century has slowly been turned into a line of asymmetry through rapid development of infrastructure on its own side by China, thus providing it the capability of rapid deployment. India is fast trying to catch up but lags behind due to many domestic factors.
There was also an attempt to maintain peace through a series of border management and Confidence Building Measures, including the mechanism to resolve the boundary dispute. But China more often than not has been violating these because of its better capability to man the LAC viz a viz India. Any effort by the Indian Army to improve infrastructure on its side is objected to and resisted by the Chinese.
China believes in buying time and wearing out the opponent while building its own strengths. It has been able to achieve the asymmetry on the LAC as well as reorganise and modernise its army. In the process it has begun to be more assertive on its “Claim Line” by not just patrolling but by camping and digging in those areas. Of late, even in those areas where the claim line and the LAC coincide, China has begun to transgress in order to provide grazing grounds to the locals. It is testing India’s response so that it can enhance its claim line in those areas as well. In a nutshell, the PLA has become very strong in the mountainous sector through which the LAC runs. Our response has been to meet the Chinese threat through enhanced deployment and efforts to improve the infrastructure. In other words we have been trying to pit our strength against the enemy’s strength. China is happy with status quo and is not keen to resolve border issues. It feels confident of “managing” conflicts along the LAC. India will always be subjected to pinpricks at will by the dragon. Is this the way we want to tame the dragon and let it become a “threat” from a “challenge?” The answer obviously is “No.”
Strength begets respect and instils fear in potential adversaries. China also respects strength. India’s strength does not lie in the lofty trans-Himalayas but in the high seas. “The lion cannot protect himself from traps and the fox cannot defend himself from wolves. One must, therefore, be a fox to recognise traps and a lion to frighten wolves,” said Machiavelli, the famous Italian philosopher and writer. In relation to China, India needs to develop both the qualities.
If our strength is on the high seas and not in the mountainous regions, then why are we still obsessed with our frontiers? India must take advantage of its geostrategic location in the Indo-Pacific region and develop the maritime strength to tame the dragon. While doing all this we need to maintain our strategic autonomy.
(The author is a Jammu-based veteran, political commentator, columnist, security and strategic analyst.)
