Russia’s neutrality in the South China Sea dispute and its understanding of Sino-Pak collusive threat to India can help limit China’s sphere of influence
Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi’s tour of four South Asian countries in the backdrop of the Ukrainian crisis and the Sri Lankan economic crisis displayed its sheer desperation for the future of OBOR. President Vladimir Putin has brutally cut short President Xi Jinping’s ‘China Dream’, resulting in a blockade of the Russian route. The persistent problems of Central Asia make the situation dicier for Beijing. Within South Asia, the Sri Lankan economic and political turmoil has made small countries like Nepal more apprehensive of Chinese intentions. The consequences of the Sri Lankan balance of payments crisis owing to its decision to sideline international creditors have accelerated the process of balancing against Beijing.
The South Asian countries except for Pakistan now acknowledge the financial implications of Chinese loans. For instance, Myanmar has started pushing back against the Chinese tactics and has moved strategically closer to India. Against this backdrop, Wang’s visit had the objective of assuring the Chinese leadership and the international community of its goodwill in South Asia just before the 20th Party Congress.
For Afghanistan, Wang continued Beijing’s policy of having official talks with the U.N. designated terrorist Sirajuddin Haqqani, the supposed “interior minister”. Post the South Asia tour after the Third Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on the Afghan issue, Beijing displayed a strategic inclination to give legitimacy to the Taliban by sidelining its human rights abuses. The sidelining of India on the Afghan issue is indicative of its sinister objectives. It is here that the US could have played a play a divisive role through its strategic flirting. Beijing is wary of its sea routes and is searching for alternate routes via Pakistan and Iran. The development hints at the upcoming ‘normalisation’ of the relations, and an extension of the BRI corridor might follow. With Iran already by its side because of an anti-American stand, the strategic experts are wary of a possible new axis of non-democratic regimes in India’s vicinity which perhaps can reshape the Asian power dynamics unless skilfully managed. Nevertheless, it is not very likely to expect Tehran to forgo its Shia factor in favour of Afghanistan and Pakistan in return for the lucrativeness of the infrastructure development.
There is little that China has to offer to Pakistan, which is neck-deep in its debt trap. Islamabad owes China $24.7 billion, or 27 per cent of its external debt. Apart from its projection as a ‘fortress of Islam’ or a Muslim brotherhood leader with nuclear weapons, the political turmoil finds no takers. The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) makes things worse for the CPEC Projects passing through Gwadar. Any amount of force used either by Pakistan or China could raise the human rights issue at an international level. Instead, the sword of blacklisting hangs over the country, especially with its ‘democratic coup’ that the world is witnessing.
The mess gets all the more complicated with the different foreign policy approaches of Bajwa and Imran Khan. It is perhaps for the first time that the tussle between the civilian and military results in differing aligning positions, making the developments quite intriguing. In either case, economic sanctions on Pakistan due to its proximity with Russia, human rights violations, increasing Islamic fundamentalism or upsetting the US can result in another route blockage and closure of another chapter of Beijing’s ‘CPEC dream’. Also, it is essential to recall that the US has contributed immensely in terms of military supplies. Any disruption in the supply of their spare parts can tactically benefit India.
Further, in the case of Nepal, no new BRI Project loans were announced despite Beijing’s displayed readiness for China-Nepal Cross Border Railway (CNR) project, connecting Keyrong in Tibet to Kathmandu. The focus remained mainly on technical cooperation and bilateral trade. Concerning India, Beijing’s clumsy geopolitical approach in which it criticised India at the OIC conclave in Islamabad and simultaneously extended an ‘olive branch’ through unannounced and unplanned visits did more harm than good to the image of China. Its dicey strategic communication on the issue of LAC ensured that for the coming few months or perhaps years, the stalemate between the two would continue.
The visit is not a change of heart for India but a strategy-change due to the practical constraints of its “no limit” agreement with Russia. China has well understood that it cannot antagonise the West and India at the same time when it cannot simultaneously put into effect the sanctions on Russia. The current momentum can be best described as “to secure peace, is to prepare for war”, as was asserted by Carl Von Clausewitz. India hence should be mindful of the Chinese strategy.
Through his visits, Wang sought to highlight first the diverging perceptions of South Asian countries about one another in the region and second, amongst the Quad members, by trying to see whether New Delhi was hesitant or not to host the Chinese Foreign Minister at this crucial point of time. China could have highlighted an Indian refusal as India’s arrogance owing to its strategic proximity to the Quad members. As the Quad members understand the dynamics of India-Russia, especially about its defence supplies, the acceptance of India’s stand on Ukraine ensured that Wang’s visit had no substantial outcomes, which probably can leave Xi Jinping running out of options as it has become all the more pertinent for China to maintain friendly relations with the democratic countries. The acceptance can play an essential role in India’s favour in the triangular dynamics between Russia, India and China.
Although a tricky one, the Ukrainian crisis has been managed well by the government, consequent to which most of the powers today look up to India for its support and possible solution. Despite India’s absence in various resolutions against Russia, the announcement of Japan aiming to invest $42 billion over the next five years in India speaks volumes of India’s geopolitical importance. If one is ready to ignore the rise in fuel prices, the crisis, in a nutshell, has increased India’s strategic hedging capabilities towards Washington and Moscow. India’s decision will also push the trade and economic initiatives against Chinese economic leverage, such as the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative, U.S.-Japan Competitiveness and Resilience Partnership, G-7’s Build Back Better World initiative and the E.U.’s Global Gateway, without leaving much response opportunities for Moscow.
From a defence perspective, considering Russia’s neutrality in the South China Sea dispute and its understanding of the Sino-Pak collusive threat to India, a new effort can be made to limit China’s sphere of influence. Thus, new tactical strategies have to be formulated. With peace on Russia’s eastern borders, India, the US, and other like-minded powers can attempt to create and strengthen a double military barrier system to contain Chinese wolf-warrior diplomacy. The inside ring can probably consist of China’s contemporary rivals like Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. The outer ring can consist of Australia, India, the US, and Japan, wherein there is active military intelligence coordination, apart from other cooperative defence activities that increase the interoperability of military platforms.
As China’s strategic leverage decreases, so do Xi’s re-election chances. Such a development makes it a fertile ground for China to increase its belligerence. The recent cyber-attacks on the power grid near Ladakh are an example and hence the country should remain alert.
(The writer is an Assistant Professor at Central University of Punjab, Bathinda. The views expressed are personal.)
