Amid escalating tensions in West Asia, the dynamics between Iran, Houthis, and international powers have profound implications. As conflicts rage from Gaza to Yemen, the interplay of geopolitical interests, regional alliances, and economic stakes underscores the complexities of the situation and its far-reaching consequences
Since the war in Gaza has escalated, Houthis are retaliating by burning and attacking commercial shipments connecting Europe and Asia in the Indian Ocean. Houthis have asserted that their response sends a clear message: Palestinians are not alone, and they will take revenge on Israel. At the same time, the Western world, led by the United States and supported by twenty other countries, has sent a stern warning to Houthis and Iran, saying that blocking, attacking, and burning commercial ships violates international laws and adversely affects the economies of Asia and Europe. The US’ reaction is also about preserving its prestige as the global police, which has been declining over the past decade. However, its unconditional support for Israel’s actions in Gaza, in response to Hamas’s terrorist activity on October 7 last year, has yielded little success.
The US officially acknowledges that Gaza has been devastated, resulting in the death of thousands of Palestinians, mostly women and children. Israeli actions have failed to achieve their central objective of destroying Hamas as a terrorist organisation. However, the transformation of Gaza into a battleground has brought shame upon humanity. The recent declaration at the International Court of Justice has further embarrassed American leadership and its continual support of Israel. The US’ frequent use of veto power has rendered the UN Security Council’s status irrelevant. The pursuit of peace and security seems distant, especially with the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine overshadowing it. Israel’s relentless actions in Gaza have further undermined the legitimacy of the United Nations. The American leadership bears the burden of discrediting the UN shamelessly.
The military actions against the Houthis carry multiple implications, with the most prominent being perceived as the United States and Israel’s confrontation with Iran. For Iranians, proxies such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Houthis across the Arab world symbolise an axis of resistance and represent a deeply ingrained belief that any coercive structure will face retaliation, framing it as a battle against "oppressors." Amid the crisis, India’s engagement with Iran and China’s official request for Iran to restrain the Houthis signify more than just a clash between the US, Israel, Iran, and Russia. The global economy and the disruptions to the supply chain, amid conflicts ranging from Ukraine to Gaza, have significant implications for countries that have refrained from taking sides.
The brief summary of Houthis’ actions in the Gulf of Aden has been both impactful and exasperating. The ongoing crossfire has failed to dissuade Houthis, despite Yemen enduring a decade-long civil war since the Arab uprising, resulting in the loss of millions of lives. While last year’s reconciliation between Saudis and Iranians temporarily curbed Houthi aggression, their recent actions carry far-reaching repercussions, posing threats to the national interests and security of numerous countries.
The larger question now remains: can Iran stop the Houthis, and will they heed Tehran’s calls? The fact is, Houthi actions have been perceived collectively as Iranian manoeuvers using proxies against the US and Israel. The decline of US power in the region and the rise of Iranian proxies have emboldened Iran to pursue its goals. The strategic planning behind Hamas’s actions on October 7 suggests that Tehran and Iran’s de facto leader, Khamenei, were discontented with the Abraham Accords and the normalisation between Israel and Arab countries. The Palestinian pretext has played into Iran’s hands. Iran now asserts itself as more powerful and accepted by the larger Arab world, which similarly opposes normalization. However, the recent Houthi attacks go beyond the traditional calculus of Iranian proxy actions against the US.
The crisis runs much deeper than the typical narrative suggesting that Iran controls Houthis similarly to Hezbollah and even Hamas. The relationship between Iran and Houthis is complex and requires a thorough reevaluation of both parties. Iran has two centres of power, with a theocratic regime under Ayatollah Khamenei wielding more influence than President Raisi. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards, which train and oversee proxies, operate primarily under Khamenei’s authority. Similarly, Houthis function more as strategic allies than conventional proxies. While Iranian proxies are supervised, supported, and influenced by Khamenei’s IRGC, Houthis pursue agendas beyond Tehran’s control, including those beyond Khamenei’s influence. It is undeniable that Houthis have received support from Iran and the IRGC, but their dependence on them is less significant compared to Hamas and Hezbollah.
Houthis are the product of civil wars and cycles of violence, positioning themselves as rulers of a divided Yemen. Their response extends beyond Israel’s actions in Gaza; the more the US-led axis bombs Sana’a, the more Houthis will grow like a phoenix. They have three major objectives, some aligned with Iran and some differing. With the ongoing horror inflicted by Israel in Gaza and US-led actions in Yemen, Houthis are gaining legitimacy in the region and beyond, attracting radicalised new recruits and sending a message to the larger Arab world that their cause is a holy war. Secondly, Houthis seek official recognition akin to the Taliban in Afghanistan; their belligerence has garnered global attention, and any move towards normalisation will likely occur through dialogue, similar to the Doha Agreement, which would grant them political legitimacy. Thirdly, they aim for acceptance in the Arab and Muslim world as a moral and religious force fighting for Palestinians, rather than being viewed solely as an Iranian proxy.
Iran has indeed played a significant role in shaping and aiding the growth of Houthis, similar to its involvement with Hezbollah and Hamas. Despite the peace agreement brokered by China with Saudi Arabia, Houthis have ceased firing missiles into Saudi territory, and Saudi efforts to defeat them have been unsuccessful. However, the Tehran-Houthi alliance transcends mere Shia narratives, despite historical and ideological ties with Iran. Houthis aspire to establish a civil state rather than adhere to a theocratic regime, and they are open to integrating Yemen’s Sunni population.
Additionally, Houthis’ war economy does not solely rely on Tehran for economic support, contrary to popular belief. Instead, it thrives on various illicit activities in the Bab-el-Mandeb area, including ransom, looting, and the mobilisation of oil money, amounting to an estimated $2 billion. The Houthis’ strategic partnership with Iran serves Iran’s chokepoint strategy to sustain its economy, with Iran controlling the Persian Gulf and utilising the Bab-el-Mandeb route to supply arms to Hamas and support Houthis’ control over the area. However, beyond this arrangement, the Houthis sustain themselves through their own means, including potential arms supplies from North Korea. Lastly, Houthis themselves are not inclined to become mere proxies of Tehran; they exhibit a multi-aligned stance rather than strictly adhering to a proxy role.
One significant impact Tehran has had on Houthis is the support provided by Hezbollah and IRGC forces for drones, missiles, and guerrilla training. While Tehran could potentially exert control over Houthis, they have their own objectives and may not simply submit to Iran as a proxy, despite their alignment. It is highly likely that Houthis would resist Tehran’s influence, but this depends on how much pressure Khomeini and the IRGC can exert. Houthis have claimed that they only target ships flagged by the US and its allies, but the international commercial shipping industry is more intricate and risky. These risks translate into increased costs, including higher insurance premiums for commercial ships. Moreover, many shipping companies do not fly flags of specific countries, undermining the distinctions Houthis have been claiming.
The world is unprepared for an alternative route due to the high costs involved, particularly as economies are already strained by the conflict in Ukraine. India and China have approached Tehran to rein in Houthis, whose actions disrupt trade between Europe and Asia, accounting for over 40 per cent of global trade. The stakes of the situation are greater than they may initially appear, and while Tehran stands to gain strategically, it cannot risk disrupting its relations with China, India, and beyond. The challenge lies with the centres of power in Tehran, which have tended to prioritise ideology over pragmatism in foreign policy decisions. Ultimately, the decision rests with Khamenei as to how far Houthis will be allowed to proceed and whether they will acquiesce on all fronts. Responses may vary; Houthis may temporarily halt their actions but are unlikely to cease until they achieve their objectives, which align with those of Iran but are more akin to a strategic partnership than a mere proxy relationship.
(The writer is teacher at Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace & Conflict resolution, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi)
